

Agenda for a meeting of the Bradford West Area Committee to be held on Thursday, 17 November 2022 at 5.30 pm in Committee Room 1 - City Hall, Bradford

Members of the Committee – Councillors	Alternates - Councillors
LABOUR	LABOUR
Amran	Ahmed
Alipoor	Akhtar
Azam	Duffy
Engel	Arshad Hussain
Ibrar Hussain	Shabir Hussain
Kamran Hussain	Lal
Nazir	Mohammed
Regan	Mullaney
Shaheen	Thirkill

Notes:

- This agenda can be made available in Braille, large print or tape format on request by contacting the Agenda contact shown below.
- The taking of photographs, filming and sound recording of the meeting is allowed except if Councillors vote to exclude the public to discuss confidential matters covered by Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972. Recording activity should be respectful to the conduct of the meeting and behaviour that disrupts the meeting (such as oral commentary) will not be permitted. Anyone attending the meeting who wishes to record or film the meeting's proceedings is advised to liaise with the Agenda Contact who will provide guidance and ensure that any necessary arrangements are in place. Those present who are invited to make spoken contributions to the meeting should be aware that they may be filmed or sound recorded.
- If any further information is required about any item on this agenda, please contact the officer named at the foot of that agenda item.

Decisions on items marked * are not Executive functions and may not be called in under Paragraph 8.7 of Part 3E of the Constitution.

From:

Asif Ibrahim
Director of Legal and Governance

To:

Agenda Contact: Asad Shah, 01274 432280, Committee Secretariat, City Hall, Bradford
BD1 1HY

Phone: 01274 432280

E-Mail: asad.shah@bradford.gov.uk

A. PROCEDURAL ITEMS

1. ALTERNATE MEMBERS (Standing Order 34)

The City Solicitor will report the names of alternate Members who are attending the meeting in place of appointed Members.

2. DISCLOSURES OF INTEREST

(Members Code of Conduct - Part 4A of the Constitution)

To receive disclosures of interests from members and co-opted members on matters to be considered at the meeting. The disclosure must include the nature of the interest.

An interest must also be disclosed in the meeting when it becomes apparent to the member during the meeting.

Notes:

- (1) Members may remain in the meeting and take part fully in discussion and voting unless the interest is a disclosable pecuniary interest or an interest which the Member feels would call into question their compliance with the wider principles set out in the Code of Conduct. Disclosable pecuniary interests relate to the Member concerned or their spouse/partner.*
- (2) Members in arrears of Council Tax by more than two months must not vote in decisions on, or which might affect, budget calculations, and must disclose at the meeting that this restriction applies to them. A failure to comply with these requirements is a criminal offence under section 106 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992.*
- (3) Members are also welcome to disclose interests which are not disclosable pecuniary interests but which they consider should be made in the interest of clarity.*
- (4) Officers must disclose interests in accordance with Council Standing Order 44.*

3. INSPECTION OF REPORTS AND BACKGROUND PAPERS

(Access to Information Procedure Rules – Part 3B of the Constitution)

Reports and background papers for agenda items may be inspected by contacting the person shown after each agenda item. Certain reports and background papers may be restricted.

Any request to remove the restriction on a report or background paper should be made to the relevant Strategic Director or Assistant Director whose name is shown on the front page of the report.

If that request is refused, there is a right of appeal to this meeting.

Please contact the officer shown below in advance of the meeting if you wish to appeal.

(Asad Shah - 01274 432280)

4. PUBLIC QUESTION TIME

(Access to Information Procedure Rules – Part 3B of the Constitution)

To hear questions from electors within the District on any matter this is the responsibility of the Committee.

Questions must be received in writing by the City Solicitor in Room 112, City Hall, Bradford, BD1 1HY, by mid-day on Tuesday 15 September 2022.

(Asad Shah - 01274 432280)

B. BUSINESS ITEMS

5. WORK OF THE DISTRICT YOUTH SERVICE TEAM

1 - 22

The report of the Strategic Director, Place (**Document “N”**) provides an overview of the work of the District Youth Work team and gives an update on work undertaken by the District Youth Service during the last 12 months.

Recommended –

- 1) That the work undertaken by the Youth Service District team, as detailed in this report be welcomed.**
- (2) That staff working in the District Youth Service Team be congratulated on the quality and impact of the work they are delivering to the young people and communities across the Bradford district, and specifically young people in the Bradford West area.**

(Heather Wilson – 01274 431781)

6. EXCLUSION OF THE PUBLIC

Recommended –

That the public be excluded from the meeting during consideration of Appendices E&G relating to the Progress report on the work of the Prevent Team in the Bradford West Area, on the grounds that it is likely in view of the nature of the business to be transacted or the nature of the proceedings, that if they were present, exempt information within Paragraph 2 Information Identifying an individual (Information which is likely to reveal the identity of an individual) and Paragraph 3 Financial or Business Information relating to the financial or business affairs of any particular person (including the authority holding that information) of Section 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended), would be disclosed and it is considered that, in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in applying these exemptions outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

7. PROGRESS REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE PREVENT TEAM IN THE BRADFORD WEST AREA 23 - 118

That the report of the Strategic Director, Place (**Document “O”**) outlines the work carried out in support of the Prevent Strategy in the last twelve months in the Bradford West Area. It includes more detail about specific items raised at the Area Committee meeting held on 22nd September 2022.

Recommended –

Bradford West Area Committee is asked to note the work undertaken in implementing the Prevent agenda in Bradford (and Bradford West), its approach to supporting vulnerable people and offer any recommendations for how work can be better targeted in the constituency.

(Ian Day - 07896 728186)



Report of the Strategic Director, Place to the meeting of Bradford West Area Committee to be held on 17th November 2022

N

Subject:

WORK OF THE DISTRICT YOUTH SERVICE TEAM.

Summary statement:

This report provides an overview of the work of the District Youth Work team and gives an update on work undertaken by the District Youth Service during the last 12 months.

EQUALITY & DIVERSITY:

Young people in our most disadvantaged neighbourhoods experience a greater range of issues and are more likely to be exposed to the risk of exploitation and risk of harm. In addition, young people from 'community of interest' groups can experience extra barriers in accessing services.

The work of the district Youth Team is focussed on supporting some of the districts more vulnerable young people to mitigate the impact of this occurring and to provide a response and support to specific issues and incidents.

Alan Lunt
Interim Strategic Director
Place

Report Contact: Heather Wilson
Phone: (01274 431781)
E-mail: heather.wilson@bradford.gov.uk

Portfolio:

Neighbourhoods and Community Safety

Overview & Scrutiny Area:

Children's Services

1. SUMMARY

This report provides an overview of the work of the District Youth Work team and gives an update on work undertaken by the District Youth Service Team during the last 12 months.

2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1 The Youth Service remains committed to its work around exploitation in all forms. Exploitation is a key element of our safeguarding children processes, and all staff are trained in safeguarding and contextual considerations through initial inductions and onward training.
- 2.2 Our locality based youth provisions, in open access and street based work, consistently support information, advice and guidance to young people to raise awareness around exploitation. This agenda is to ensure young people gain critical thinking skills and that they can identify when people do not have their good interests at heart. The area based teams are well placed to identify early those young people who are vulnerable to exploitation, or who are being actively exploited and to work directly, and through linking with other agencies ensure that the right support is given to each young person so that actions can be taken to protect the young person and to disrupt the perpetrators of their exploitation.
- 2.3 To enhance the area based youth work a District Team is in place that operates a 'step up/step down' approach to support some of the districts most vulnerable young people.
- 2.4 Breaking the Cycle has been recognised for their practice, having been evaluated by the home office, Warwick university and as part of the Ofsted inspection for children's services that identified that the service was effective. The work has been identified nationally as being innovative and good practice. In the last 12 months the work has had 2 national recognitions – one in the LGC Awards in the category of Innovation, and also in the Howard League for Penal Reforms.

3. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

- 3.1 The District Youth Work Team comprises of a diverse range group of highly skilled Youth Work practitioners – the team is led by the Youth Service Development Manager, has an Advanced Practitioner, 3 senior workers, 8 full time youth workers, a behaviour support worker, a workforce development officer, 6 youth rights trainees, 2 administration support staff, a volunteering lead and a number of session leaders in charge and part time support staff. There are a number of staff who are in temporary contracts, linked to the temporary nature of some of the funding it receives. We have a number of new posts which are currently out to advert, which once recruited will support delivery of some of the newly funded upstream initiatives. A structure of the team is attached as appendix A
- 3.2 All full time youth workers working in Breaking the Cycle are trauma informed, and certified, having undertaken bespoke training they are certified Bronze (Trauma Aware) and Silver (Trauma Informed) practitioners and are due to become Gold


certified in late November. This means the Youth workers in the district team are well placed to work alongside the vulnerable cohort of referred young people who have experienced early childhood trauma, or who are facing trauma now as part of their ongoing exploitation.

- 3.3 The District Youth Work team, work across the whole district, operating from 2 operational bases, one sited in Shipley and one in Manningham. These bases provide space for 1-1 work, group work and office accommodation. They are available to access 24-7 in line with the needs of our delivery.
- 3.4 The Youth Service also have a district team of apprentices, recruited to work on the Unicef Childs Rights agenda this team of young people are undertaking level 3 learning in the college and are deployed into placements across the district.
- 3.5 The District Youth Work Team delivers the Breaking the Cycle project which provides an intensive intelligence led intervention to young people who are identified as being at risk of or who are being actively criminally exploited. The project works with young people, referred in by other professionals across the district where there are concerns or intelligence to suggest the young person is at risk or involved in serious, organised or violent crime, urban street gangs, county line trafficked, those identified as being actively criminally exploited or who may be exploiting others, or sometimes both, those who have higher than yellow Anti-social behaviour sanctions, drugs or weapons markers (as either users of, suppliers of or have been found in possession of), or who have out of character or unexplained missing incidents. Currently the team are working with over 500 individual young people.
- 3.6 Once a young person is allocated they will have a lead worker, but a number of workers in the team will work with a young person so as to not create a dependency and to ensure if we ever have to break a confidence, for example in respect of safeguarding, then the team can continue to work with individual young people, sliding in another known worker to continue the engagement. Each young person is in receipt of a bespoke and targeted intervention that is intelligence led.

Young people receive one of the following levels of intervention:

- Intensive – meaning we see a young person as much as is required to get alongside them and break the cycle of exploitation. This can mean that we see a young person every day, or several times a day/ night. Young people on intensive interventions can spend several hours with workers in order to keep them safe.
- Weekly – These young people are supported with a regular weekly intervention
- Lighter Touch – These young people tend to be in the step down part of the work where interventions have been delivered, we have seen change and a young person's exploitation has reduced to a degree that they are able to be brought back into more universal services.
- Keep in Touch – as the name would suggest, this is a checking in with young people at particular points to enable relationships to be able to be maintained and to ensure and support keeping the plans on track

- 3.7 Young people who are referred in to the Breaking the Cycle project have a bespoke 1-1 intervention that works alongside other professionals (including social care, health, education and police) to ensure the young person is flagged appropriately for their exploitation and their risks are appropriately managed, and risks of harm reduced. The team use a resilience framework to evidence distance travelled and work every day with colleagues through the risk management meeting to ensure the intervention is making a difference. The Service is also part of the monthly MACE meeting that looks to creatively work with young people who are 18 plus and where there are still concerns about their exploitation.
- 3.8 Referrals to Breaking the Cycle Project are made by a wide range of other professionals with Police and Social Care making up the largest majority of the referrals received. These can be in response to calls for service, or through thresholds being met, or through a professionals concern for a young person.



- 3.9 The district youth work team provide interventions that are district wide – the work does not lend itself to alignment to wards or constituencies, as many exploited young people present and are exploited across boundaries across the district, West Yorkshire and wider afield. The team work closely with Children’s Social Care Emergency Duty Team providing an out of hours’ response service that sees workers collecting young people who have been county line trafficked and found in different parts of the country. This can mean long trips at hours that are routinely classed as unsociable and overnight. We actively support the National Referral Mechanism and the identification for national flags for Childrens exploitation where appropriate. A child taken into police protection is often supported by members of the team, and often our work can start in the early hours of the morning in the back of a van, on a journey back to a place of safety. Sometimes this work brings young people back into the district, other times we support young people at locations outside of the district until a time that a placement of safety can be identified. Where children are placed out of district and are known to the service we endeavour to continue the support and engagement in preparation for returns to the district.

3.10 The team are currently working with 518 open cases, having had referrals totalling 1369 in the lifetime of the project. The 518 open cases are broken down as below:

BD1	BD2	BD3	BD4	BD5	BD6	BD7	BD8	BD9	BD10
5	36	31	48	42	34	41	30	27	35

BD11	BD12	BD13	BD14	BD15	BD16	BD17	BD18	BD19	BD20
0	11	20	11	16	8	12	24	1	8

BD21	BD22	LS29	Out of district
35	18	16	9

Males	Female
89%	11%

NB we have seen a 3% increase in females over the last 12 months

Postcodes captured indicate place of residency of young person at point of initial referral and not necessarily where they continue to live during the intervention or where their exploitation takes or has taken place.

Risk indicators – identified / evidenced at initial referral

Serious, Organised or violent crime	29%
Urban Street Gangs	46%
County Line Trafficked	32%
Criminally Exploited / Exploiting others	62%
In receipt of a higher than yellow ASB Sanction	42%
Weapons marker (user, supplier, possession)	35%
Drugs marker (user, supplier, possession)	46%
Out of character / unexplained missing incident	27%

This figure has only been captured in recordings in the last 6 months

3.11 Recognising that the work of Breaking the Cycle is focussed on supporting those who are criminally exploited the team have secured further funding to upstream the work and this enables work to take place where there are early indicators of exploitation. This includes work in the A&E department at BRI hospital 7 nights a week, working 4pm to midnight the team see young people who attend hospital due to incidents of violence, sharp instrument injuries or with injuries that do not match their explanation. The team will also work with those who present with contributing factors to exploitation like drug or other substance misuse, overdoses and those in mental health crisis.

3.12 This work has seen hundreds of interventions with young people from across the district and provides support to young people as they go through treatment services at the hospital, which includes on ward and at point of discharge there is an onward support offer. This gives continued support, building on the relationships started in the hospital environment. This work is highly respected and has proven to be successful at identifying early signs of exploitation. The team work closely with clinical staff in the department to ensure the voice of young people is heard and that they get the right support during their stay in the department.

- 3.13 At a recent Area Committee meeting in the Bradford South area one of the young people who attended from the local youth club highlighted the value of having met and been supported by youth workers whilst in attendance within the A&E department. He shared his journey and how the support and introduction to the wider work of the service had supported him to become a young leader within the area.
- 3.14 The work of the Breaking the Cycle A&E Team has recently nominated in the Council Service Excellence Awards and were finalists in 2 categories - Team of the Year and Partnership and Collaboration.

tweet from the partner Bradford Teaching Hospitals



A recent communication came from a young person in the form of a Thank you card, it said;

'Dear Youth Workers, a young person rarely tells a youth worker that a fist bump or a smile is all that they can reveal. I wanted to say thank you for taking the time, thank you for being there when I needed you and thank you for seeing me every day, and for your guiding hand and support.'

A grandparent sent a message to the team saying;

'E has attended Bradford Royal A&E a few time recently – I don't know what we would have done without the outstanding care concern and professionalism and help we received from the youth workers – they were my saving grace in a time when I was desperate and I didn't have a clue about what was going on and the things that were impacting on E's life. The workers calmly supported E and gained trust on each hospital visit E had, they appeared like magic and helped in so many ways. Everyone has been brilliant and after leaving hospital the support continued - E now attends the local youth club'

- 3.15 The district team also provide a service to young people in crisis through the work of the focussed deterrent car. This sees police and youth work colleagues working

together across the district deployed to live time incidents of serious violence, with a remit of working together to prevent incidents of violence reoccurring once victim and perpetrator have been removed from a street based incident. The team is deployed in the aftermath of incidents of serious violence and fill the vacuum often left when the victim has been taken to hospital, suspect arrested and what is left young people in the streets.

- It is de-briefing young people after an event who haven't been directly involved but might have witnesses it.
- To speak with witnesses of serious violence after an incident to see if they will support prosecutions or consent to interventions and support.
- To deploy into areas in which have high levels of ASB / concern around child exploitation to engage with young people.
- To deploy alongside proactive police and partner's resources, to de-brief tactics such as stop and search.

- 3.16 Officers undertaking this work with Youth Workers are positive about the difference made with one officer recently feeding back to their Inspector that:

"It was the best shift she has worked in a long time and how her eyes have been opened to the work that Breaking the cycle does. She had no idea how vulnerable some of the youths are that you work with, and she could not believe how they opened up to the youth worker and the valuable intelligence they were offering up when speaking to them.

Most of the caseload is in the area where the police officer works she realised that one of his caseload is one that she had referred a few months ago. It has given her faith that the system works and the referrals we make are actioned. She is going to go back to her team and reiterate how valuable the referrals are.

It is clear that the partnership between the Youth Service Breaking the Cycle and the Bradford District Policing is working and that Bradford is leading the way in this level of partnership working.

- 3.17 The work of the district youth work team is keen to where ever possible step young people back into mainstream and universal provisions. Our wider area based youth work provisions provide a suitable support for some young people, whereas for others the step down process is following a specific interest, for example boxing or football. We have seen a number of our young people who have been supported by Breaking the Cycle step into opportunities provided by the District team including kickstart and traineeships, which has given viable alternatives to criminal lifestyles for some of our young people. This is an area we are keen to further develop and we have been working with Skills House on this matter.
- 3.18 The Youth Service, as part of its district wide offer provides workforce development to the youth work practitioners working across all parts of the district. Over recent months the service has inducted new starter staff, and provided training that has developed understanding of world affairs and the impact these have on our district. The "solutions not sides" sessions were organised to provide an informative understanding of the Palestine situation. This packed training session enabled

youth workers to have a safe space in which to discuss the situation and to understand its impact on the districts citizens. This training is to empower youth work staff to start and feel increased confidence to have difficult conversations with young people in youth work settings.

- 3.19 The district team has also utilised their skills and knowledge and are the provider of training around county lines and criminal exploitation for the district wide multiagency Bradford Safeguarding Partnership. This has seen large numbers of people who work with young people from a variety of settings trained to spot and be more exploitation aware. 1080 young people and 90 professionals in the last year have received one of our awareness raising training packages.

Every Neighbourhood Policing Team have also had a bespoke awareness and training package about the work of the Breaking the Cycle team. We have also delivered training to 2 youth club settings outside of district, a health centre / GP Practice team and students and staff at the college in Shipley and Bradford.

From this extensive delivery we have received lots of positive feedback about the value of the training delivered – a flavour of the feedback is captured in the quotes, shown in appendix B

Our training calendar continues to grow and we are developing new packages of training to support understanding and awareness around exploitation that is linked to finances including money muleing, Esports, Loot boxes and Microtransactions and safer sharenting (pictures you share online). These new packages will be delivered alongside those currently offered around county lines, weapons and exploitation.

- 3.20 The Youth Service has run a very successful kickstart programme, recruiting 11 young people to be trained to become sports leaders. Each participant has had part of their working week in their own learning where they have worked towards gaining a range of sports qualifications, and part of their week where they have worked in placements in a range of locations that has enabled them to put into practice their sports learning. As they have come to the end of their kickstart placements a number of the young people have gone on to secure employment with the Council and with some of our partner organisations.
- 3.21 The district team run a number of district wide youth work opportunities – the team headed up the 100 young people to Coventry residential, taking 100 young people on a cultural trip to the Capital of Culture city of Coventry to explore how they had involved young people in their capital of culture delivery. The involvement of young Bradfordians within the Bradford bid was considered to be one of the strengths in securing Bradford as the 2025 City of Culture.
- 3.22 The District Team have also run the recent “Takeover Challenge” where we invite young people to take over the roles of key decision makers in the District. This saw the leader of the council and the Childrens Portfolio Holder being involved in takeover and sharing their day with young people. This included attendance at the executive meeting and spending time in the leader’s office. For many young people this presents an opportunity to be heard, directly by those who make and influence

decisions within the district and this has proven to be empowering for young people who have taken part.

- 3.23 Alongside the core work of the District Youth Work team is a plethora of additional duties that the team facilitates and responds to – these include detached youth work into hotspot areas or in response to Community tensions to support reassurance and engagement alongside area based youth work teams. Our work forms an integral and responsive part of special operations such as Bonfire night operations and visits to the city by judges and VIPs. We provide Youth Workers to large scale events in the city centre, providing a “lost children” service, alongside detached and youth interventions during large events. We do wherever possible look to find creative solutions to emerging youth issues in the district – we pride ourselves on the flexibility of the team and the responsive nature of our work across all our service areas – a recent email from a Bradford East elected member acknowledged the value of the work:

‘I would like to thank you and the breaking the cycle team and all others that were involved, for your help and assistance in the urgent matter of xxxxx where some of the buses were vandalised, the response of the team to the matter is appreciated by the bus company and the council and I am sure by the residents of Bradford as they do not wish to see their bus service disrupted by few mindless individuals. Your team does great work and make sure young people do not get in trouble. Once again thank you for everything the team has done, I will be highlighting their good work in the Bradford East Area committee too as it is important that everyone in decision making positions need to be aware of the work our teams do and how important they area to our areas and district’.

4. FINANCIAL & RESOURCE APPRAISAL

- 4.1 The District Youth Service Team is funded through a combination of Council budget (Children’s Services & Public Health) external grants (Violence Reduction Unit) and ‘fee earning’ externally commissioned services (Health).

The overall budget for the District Youth Service Team is £1,088,000

We are expanding some areas of our work into a wider West Yorkshire footprint and this will see further traded services developing over the coming 12 months.

5. RISK MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES

The implementation of the planned budget for the Youth Service is subject to the internal risk management plan of the Council and progress is reported to the Place Departmental Management Team.

6. LEGAL APPRAISAL

There are no legal implications apparent within the context of this report.

7. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

7.1 EQUALITY & DIVERSITY

8

Young people in our most disadvantaged neighbourhoods experience a greater range of issues and are more likely to be exposed to the risk of exploitation and risk of harm. In addition, young people from 'community of interest' groups can experience extra barriers in accessing services.

The work of the district Youth Team is focussed on supporting some of the districts more vulnerable young people to mitigate the impact of this occurring and to provide a response and support to specific issues and incidents.

7.2 SUSTAINABILITY IMPLICATIONS

There are no sustainability implications apparent within the context of this report.

7.3 GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IMPACTS

There are no greenhouse gas emission implications apparent within the context of this report.

7.4 COMMUNITY SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Young people from across Bradford West engage in the work that is delivered by the District Youth Work team that supports the objectives of the District Community Safety Plan.

The Community Safety Partnership and the Office of the Deputy Mayor, through the Violence Reduction Unit, supports the work of the District Youth Work Team.

7.5 HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

Some of the work of the District Youth Work team is undertaken with young people who are highly vulnerable and who have been in 'high risk' situations. Engagement with the Team by young people is voluntary and always carried out with their agreement and support.

7.6 TRADE UNION

There are no trade union implications apparent within the context of the report.

7.7 WARD IMPLICATIONS

The work of the District Youth Work team takes place on a 'needs basis' which can include some or all wards at any point in time. Resources and support are targeted through referrals and young people presenting in A&E and is generally not directly related to individual wards.

8. NOT FOR PUBLICATION DOCUMENTS

There are no 'not for publication' items.

9. OPTIONS

The majority of the work is targeted and responds to the specific requirement of funding providers. Notwithstanding, Bradford West Area Committee is asked to note

the report and the work of the District Youth Work team, providing any recommendations for how services can be tailored to better respond to vulnerable young people living in the Bradford West constituency.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) That the work undertaken by the Youth Service District team, as detailed in this report be welcomed.
- (2) That staff working in the District Youth Service Team be congratulated on the quality and impact of the work they are delivering to the young people and communities across the Bradford district, and specifically young people in the Bradford West area.

11. APPENDICES

Appendix A District Youth Service structure chart


Appendix B Feedback from participants in Youth Service training.

Appendix C Case Studies from Breaking the Cycle work

12. BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS

None

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Bradford West Area Committee – APPENDIX B

Quotes received from training and awareness raising sessions provided by the Youth Service
Breaking the Cycle

Delivered a very difficult topic really well. The examples are really helpful as well as the hard hitting video' (Safeguarding week delivery)

'I came with no real knowledge about County Lines, but I feel now more confident about the topic and more able to see the signs' (Youth Work Trainee)

'Giving examples of real situations. Passionate trainer – wealth of experience and knowledge' (Education Safeguarding Officer)

'The workshop has been one of the best which I have ever attended. Giving real examples and stories helped me to understand the topic and to help to look at signs at children who we work with. Presenters were very enthusiastic which has helped me pay attention from the beginning to the end. Thank you.' (Education Safeguarding)

'showing the bigger picture in a realistic approach. Showing reality and not sugar coated. Great knowledge of (subject)' (Bradford Safeguarding Partnership)

'I have had a lot of light bulb moments – thank you' (Safeguarding week delivery)

'very positive work you do and the feedback is excellent [from parents] – I'm so interested to know how you engage / build relationships so successfully.' (Safeguarding week delivery)

'Brought county lines to life. Everyone knows it happens but the training made it feel real.' (Safeguarding week delivery)

'I work in CCE, and your team do a great job in Breaking the Cycle for the children who are at risk or actually being exploited – keep up the good work' (CCE Specialist minute taker)

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Bradford West Area Committee – Appendix C

Breaking the Cycle

Case Study

Young Person's background:

Family environment growing up was chaotic with mum and her new parents continually moving in together, all 4 siblings have different dad and all had no contact with their respective fathers and a lack of stable adult relationship at home

School/Education environment – the young person has undiagnosed additional needs, this has made it challenging for him to engage with education as he had struggled to keep up with peers and had become more isolated as a result of this. The young person also has challenges with his mental health which are linked with his academic failure, leaving school with no qualifications - the young person has been NEET for the last 2 years

Early childhood trauma has led to the young person struggling to maintain trusting relationships with adults. The young person has alongside the trust issues, some real social anxiety, and was overly concerned of what others think of him

The young person had turned to crime, to a wider group of friends who did not have his good interests at heart and this saw him involved in youth criminality and criminal convictions. He became involved in county lines and was referred into Breaking the Cycle project

Details of the intervention and distance travelled

- Work with the young person had also considered the need to focus on raising his self-esteem, this was very low at the start of the intervention. Breaking the cycle has supported this young person through positive activities to get him to the stage where he is able to engage with others, outside of his usual peer group.
- After the self-esteem work Breaking the Cycle staff travelled trained the young person to be confident about using public transport, which was a significant barrier to him seeking employment or training opportunities beyond the area he could walk to
- Due to being NEET the young person needed intensive support to help him consider how he can progress in life, and to identify viable alternative to criminality. Breaking The Cycle has delivered Criminal Exploitation interventions to this young person, in a way that he has been able to understand and see his place within this, with an overall aim to decrease him being drawn to situations where he is vulnerable to CCE.
- Breaking the Cycle have engaged this young person in positive activities to get the young person to a stage where he has applied for college access to employment course.

- The young person regularly smokes cannabis; he is also very open about this. Prior to his arrest he has been missing with his friend X for around ten days and they have ended up in Blackpool and later Scarborough where the young person was arrested for possession of drugs (with intent to supply).
- The young person's associates are young people known to Social Care, Youth Justice Service and Breaking the Cycle. Due to the Breaking the Cycles relationship with the other young people, we have been able to remove the drivers and support the young person to start to make more positive life choices. The work that the youth workers together have undertaken with the wider friendship group has also kept his friendships strong, whilst facilitating a way out of criminality for all of the group of friends.
- The young person maintained a code of silence for a long time and would not say who he was drug running for when he was arrested, this indicates he was still vulnerable to becoming a victim of CCE again. Over time the Breaking the Cycle youth worker 'broke' the young person's 'code of silence' to the point where the young person had started to disclose small details around their exploitation and the people who were the exploiters.
- The worker's relationships with the young people was paramount in this case as the young people needed to trust that if they disclosed details of their exploitation and further criminal activities, that they would still be supported and protected. The young person gave small pieces of information and then waited to see what happened with that information to help him decide if he could trust the worker before he furnished us with more information, which was key to disrupting the exploiters and identifying others impacted by the same people
- The young person has not engaged well historically with children's social care, through the Breaking the Cycle relationship the youth worker has managed to convince the young person to engage with Social Care services to a stage where with support from the Breaking the Cycle Youth worker he had been able to join the Child In Need meeting.

Challenges faced during the intervention

- The young person had a lack of trust in adults, Mum often had relationships with males that lasted for a short periods of time, the young person was used to having lots of people in and out of his life and he thought the Breaking the Cycle worker would be another male to come in and out of this life. The challenge was for him to be able to trust the worker.
- The challenge was the need to build the relationship and other services known to the young man and his family did not have capacity to spend enough quality time with him to be able to build the relationship, and there was not a relationship with his allocated social worker He did not like always the things he was been told about his behaviours and what needed to change. He did not see himself as being vulnerable or unsafe in the same way that those around him did.
- Home life was a challenge for the young person, home wasn't a chaotic place but this home felt more like a house to the young person as the family unit is broken as mum was staying there with her new partner none of the children liked or had a relationship with, and no efforts were made to help him to get to know the people mum brought back to the house.

Current situation:

- The young person has displayed a change in his behaviour and towards his life progression, initially when we started the work he only saw himself only as someone who was into drugs, and his future he thought would be dealing and working in criminal environments. The young person has had a complete change of heart in regards to his associations with cannabis, he is not quite there yet, but he is smoking less cannabis now that he doesn't rely on criminality to fund his habit.
- Through his engagement we discussed exploitation of vulnerabilities and being trafficked. The Breaking the Cycle youth worker has explained and worked with the young person to help him understand how he was vulnerable and how others were using this to exploit him.
- We have discussed what a national referral mechanism was, and the young person is now aware of this and is aware of how he is being treated, and that he was trafficked.
- The young person is now in a position where by he recognises the elements of his life that have made him vulnerable and he has been given skills and coping mechanisms to reduce these vulnerabilities himself.

The young person can now see and has accepted that he was vulnerable and that he still needs some support- he is happy for Breaking the Cycles to continue providing him with this support.

Our discussions have moved to future plans and employment, the young person wrote his first CV in a recent youth work session. The youth worker has supported the young person to apply for his first job as an apprentice chef and we eagerly await the results of his application, almost as if it were our own application.

VRU Case Study

Project involved in: Breaking the Cycle

District: Bradford

Young Person's background:

Having been involved in County Line activity this young man was referred into Breaking the Cycle for 1-1 support to prevent his further exploitation. He had been trafficked to sell drugs from a trap house in Cumbria and had been found there during a police operation in that area. He was flagged as being at significant risk of harm from criminal exploitation.

The young man was 16 ½ years old and has not been to school for the last 20 months, having had a reduced timetable of education for longer than he can remember he did not see the point of attending for an odd hour a day. He is a bright lad and found when in school he was put in an area with other young people who he did not like, and who he described as messing about all the time and causing chaos so he never learnt anything and he quickly got to the point where he did not see the point in going.

His home life was chaotic with 3 siblings all of whom had different fathers and who had left the family home, so mother was home alone with her son and his siblings. Mother had her own vulnerabilities and there was a lack of stability in the home environment and a lack of wider family support. This young man has really struggled to maintain relationships with adults and more recently has become untrusting of professionals, becoming at times very angry and overly anxious about situations.

He reported feeling that his exploiters were kind to him, he felt they looked after him and gave him things that he didn't get at home (trainers, money), and he had felt he was making a choice to get involved, he felt he was in control of what was going on.

Situation at the beginning of the intervention/project

- The young man had a drug misuse habit himself
- He was in debt to the exploiters after money and drugs were seized by police during their operations in Cumbria
- He told us his debt was around £6,000
- He was becoming anxious about the drugs debt and what this would mean for him as he knew he would not be able to pay this debt back
- He was concerned that his exploiters knew a lot about him, where he lived etc, and he was worried that they may turn up to the house, or threaten his family as he had previously experienced this when he had not paid back all the money as he had "ticked" people who he thought were his friends on a promise to pay and they did not make the payment, which got him into having to "graft" out of the district.
- Work with the young person a need to focus on raising his self-esteem, as this was recognised as being low at the start of the intervention.
- He did not have a good relationship with his peers, and this had become more distant the more he had been around the crime group.
- He was not at all street wise, although he thought he was quite street wise
- He believed people would "look after him" and this turned out to not be the case
- He was on a Child in Need Plan but felt he was not a child and did not engage positively with this

Challenges faced:

- Lack of trust
- Lack of positive role models
- Lack of engagement with support services
- Fear of unknown consequences linked to his drugs debt
- Home life being chaotic
- Education / employment being non existent

Current Situation

Whilst there is still some distance to go his current situation is one that is starting to stabilise His relationship with mum had broken down completely and there has been much conflict in the home. Mum blames the young man for bringing “trouble to the door” and putting his siblings at risk He has worked with his allocated worker to find alternative accommodation having signed his own section 20 to come into care of the local authority. The placement has meant that he has moved to a different part of the district and he reports feeling safer there.

He has started seeing the skills house worker who works in the Breaking the Cycle team and is starting to look forward for viable alternatives to his previous criminal ways of raising money. He is now getting benefits he is entitled to and has worked with us to secure a place in college.

He has accepted his drug misuse is a driving factor for him being exploited and whilst he is not yet ready to work with specialist drug support services he positively engages with the work Breaking the Cycle provides around harm reduction and substance misuse, which means he feels more in control of his reduction in substance misuse, which in turn is keeping him safer as he is not needing to commit crime to fund the habit he has.

His understanding of the cycle of exploitation has increased and whilst he is still saying if he had to he would return to county line activity we feel we have enough positive things and support around him to keep the likelihood of this as a low risk

He is a young man who has received intensive support from the Youth Work team and the team have seen him almost every day for a key period of time, his health and wellbeing is increasing from being around us and learning to cook, and regularly taking the therapy dog out for a walk is paying huge benefits to him getting into more positive routines

Milestones achieved:

- More positive relationship with family since moving away from family home
- Increased trust in services who are providing support
- Reduced substance misuse
- Increased health and well-being
- Increased independence and more equipped with life skills
- Increased awareness of exploitation and more considered responses to offers and quick wins
- Increased engagement in learning / training opportunities

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Report of the Strategic Director Place, to the meeting of Bradford West Area Committee to be held on 17th November 2022

O

Subject:

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE PREVENT TEAM IN THE BRADFORD WEST AREA

Summary statement:

The report outlines the work carried out in support of the Prevent strategy in the last twelve months in the Bradford West Area. It includes more detail about specific items raised at the Area Committee meeting held on 22nd September 2022.

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Assistant Director of Neighbourhoods
and Customer Services
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EQUALITY & DIVERSITY:

Equality objectives

Objective 1

We will lead the Council and the District in an open, visible and accountable way with zero tolerance for discriminatory behaviour

Our District Prevent Plan is shared across the district and published on the Council's Safeguarding Website. The Counter Terrorism Local Profile is also shared with partners on an annual basis. The work of the Prevent team is accountable to the Overview and Scrutiny Committee and we report back to them annually.

Objective 2:

We will work proactively to ensure that our workforce (at all levels) reflects the communities we serve and support all staff to achieve their full potential.

Work proactively to ensure that our workforce reflects the communities we serve and support all staff to achieve their full potential. Staff are regularly sent on Home Office, CTU and LA training to keep up to date with new materials and findings that relate to our work.

Objective 3

We will encourage all service areas to better understand our communities. We will actively engage with our communities to help people participate in decision-making processes, to improve the services we provide, and to enable more people to take part in the life in the District.

Encourage all services to better understand communities and actively engage communities to participate with decision making. We hold regular roundtable events in all district in Bradford to get the views of the community, we also have Prevent Champions across education, as well as a bi annual Prevent Advisory Group. We actively encourage feedback to our training and have recently held library information sessions to engage with the community across the District. Our projects work with communities across Bradford and we take feedback from all of these sources before making decisions about future Prevent work.

Objective 4

We will design, commission and deliver services that are accessible, inclusive and responsive to the needs of people and communities. We will provide information about services in a range of accessible formats so that people know what services are available to support them and how to access them.

We will aim to contract and commission locally wherever possible so that we can support our local economy. This will help us build a local supply chain connected to its wider social responsibilities and offering high-quality employment and training opportunities to local people, while delivering equitable services that are value for money.

Design, commission and deliver services that are accessible, inclusive and responsive to the needs of local people and communities. Provide services in a range of formats. We engage with communities and use information from the local CTLP, neighbourhood policing teams, schools and community groups, Prevent Champions and the Prevent

Advisory Group to ensure that the services, projects and resources we deliver respond to the needs of our communities. We ensure that we meet with groups beforehand to assess additional needs and also take feedback to assess how well these have been met.

1. SUMMARY

The report outlines the work carried out in support of the Prevent strategy in the last twelve months in the Bradford West Area. It includes more detail about specific items raised at the Area Committee meeting held on 22nd September 2022.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 At the Bradford West Roundtable on 2nd August 2022, the Prevent Team agreed to feedback to the Bradford West Committee on the work of Prevent in the Bradford West District and its impact.

2.2 On 22nd September 2022 the Committee asked for more a more detailed picture about the constituency. In particular, the Committee asked for the following, in addition to anything else they felt was appropriate:

- Which venues and how many venues had been utilised.
- The gender and ethnicity of the people the Prevent team were targeting and working with.
- The membership of the Prevent Advisory Group.
- Statistics which were reported quarterly to the Home Office.
- Specific information on what the Prevent Team had undertaken and achieved.
- Details of the groups most likely to be at risk of radicalisation.
- Measures undertaken to counter threats from far right extremists.
- Engagement with far right extremists.
- Funding and the funding criteria.
- The work which had been conducted with groups other than ethnic minorities.
- The precise schools engaged in the Prevent programme.
- What was not working in the strategy and measures to address those failings.

3. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

3.1 The [Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015](#) contains a duty on specified authorities to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. This is also known as the Prevent duty. (A copy of the Prevent Duty is included in the pack.)

3.2 Locally the work of Prevent is driven by the District Counter Terrorism Local Profile (included in the pack) and is focused on addressing vulnerability through education and awareness raising. The response is not focused on gender, ethnicity or any particular ideology but rather the threat and risks that have been identified by the Counter Terrorism Police and how we can best respond to those risks on a District level.

3.3 Additional information is provided that responds to the request for additional

information. This includes: Appendix The Prevent Duty; Appendix B District Counter Terrorism Local Profile; Appendix C The Roles and Responsibilities of the Prevent Team; Appendix D The District Prevent Plan; Appendix E Bradford Prevent training undertaken in the Bradford West area; Appendix F Bradford Prevent Advisory Group Terms of Reference; Appendix G Home Office Statistics for Quarter 1 and 2 2022..A West Yorkshire list of the numbers of people engaged in the Channel process is attached as Appendix H. Due to the voluntary nature of participation and the low numbers involved, to protect the anonymity of individuals numbers of people engaged in Channel cannot be provided at a District or constituency level.

4. FINANCIAL & RESOURCE APPRAISAL

4.1 There are no direct costs attributable to Bradford Council in relation to Prevent engagement. A central government grant is made annually to Bradford Council to fund Prevent work in the District. This supports the following posts and their on-costs:

- Local Authority Prevent Co-ordinator
- Prevent Engagement Officer
- Prevent Education Officer
- Administrative Support

4.2 In addition, funding is made available to support the delivery of projects which contribute to delivering key Prevent objectives in the District. Bradford has secured funding to deliver 4 projects in 2021/22.

5. RISK MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES

5.1 Governance - Local delivery of the strategy is overseen through the Bradford CONTEST governance mechanism. The structure involves partnership at all levels with a range of agencies needed to ensure that we successfully deliver CONTEST in Bradford and the Prevent Strategy within this.

5.2 Two strands of the CONTEST Strategy, Protect and Prepare, deal with emergency planning, civil contingencies and business continuity. Separate plans are in place for the delivery of this work.

5.3 Links with CONTEST governance and the Council's Safer Communities Partnership have been strengthened with an annual report being delivered and a new performance framework agreed. An annual report is also presented to the Corporate Overview and Scrutiny Committee.

5.4 A West Yorkshire CONTEST meeting is held quarterly to brief West Yorkshire authorities and share new and emerging work where there may be transferable benefit.

6. LEGAL APPRAISAL

6.1 The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 puts the Prevent programme on a statutory footing and makes delivering the Channel scheme a legal requirement. Specifically, the Act:

- Creates a new duty on certain bodies to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. The duty will apply to bodies including local authorities, the police, prisons, providers of probation services, schools, colleges, and universities.
- Allows the Secretary of State to issue guidance to those bodies on how the duty should be fulfilled.
- Gives the Secretary of State power to direct a body to take certain action, which would be used to enforce compliance where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the body has failed to discharge the duty.

6.2 The Channel scheme being statutory has:

- required local authorities to ensure a multi-agency panel exists and chair the panel;
- required the panel to develop a support plan for accepted cases and signpost to other support where cases are not accepted
- ensured consent is sought prior to support being provided;
- placed a duty to cooperate on panel partners;
- required partners to pay due regard to guidance issued by the Secretary of State;
- and allowed the Secretary of State to indemnify intervention providers that provide ideological/ theological support for the Channel programme.

7. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

7.1 SUSTAINABILITY IMPLICATIONS

There are no sustainability implications apparent

7.2 GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IMPACTS

There are no greenhouse gas emissions apparent

7.3 COMMUNITY SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

7.3.1 The Prevent Strategy for Bradford District is central to reducing the threat of terrorism and extremism through a partnership structure engaging a wide range of agencies including the West Yorkshire Police.

7.3.2 Prevent sits within the context of the District's Community Safety Plan and reports annually to the District's Safer Communities Partnership. Tackling the threat to community safety and harmony is central to Prevent delivery in the District.

7.4 HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

7.4.1 Terrorism has an impact on human rights, in particular the rights to life, freedom, respect and expression. Terrorist acts can destabilise Governments, undermine civil society, jeopardise peace and security, threaten social and economic development, and can affect the strength and resilience of our communities.

7.4.2 The Prevent Strategy provides a means for developing our partnership

arrangements and ensuring we build resilience in the community and put in place effective counter terrorism measures.

7.5 TRADE UNION

There are no trade union implications apparent

7.6 WARD IMPLICATIONS

The nature of patterns of extremism in the District mean that over time risk will vary across the district and the different ideologies that are a risk will also vary. This will impact on the levels of engagement required to mitigate any emergence of extremism and can change. Prevent work, however, does take place widely across the district. We hold quarterly roundtable meetings at a constituency level and a wide variety of Prevent project sessions, particularly in schools. Our engagement work however does educate about all types of extremism and does not focus on one particular type.

7.7 AREA COMMITTEE ACTION PLAN IMPLICATIONS

Activities outlined in the report contribute to priorities within the Locality and ward plans.

7.8 IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE

Work targeted at critical thinking and cyber safety carried out by the Prevent Team have wider benefit and help to vulnerable young people from wider risks of exploitation.

7.9 ISSUES ARISING FROM PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESMENT

None

8. NOT FOR PUBLICATION DOCUMENTS

Appendix E - Bradford Prevent work undertaken in the Bradford West this financial year

Appendix G - Providing targeted support to institutions or community groups based on a specific issue or need

The above appendices are “**Not for Publication**” on the grounds that they contain exempt information within paragraph 2 Information Identifying an individual (Information which is likely to reveal the identity of an individual) and paragraph 3 Financial or Business Information relating to the financial or business affairs of any particular person (including the authority holding that information).

Schedule 12 A of the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended) and the public interest in applying this exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

9. OPTIONS

- 9.1 Bradford West Area Committee is asked to consider the delivery of Prevent Work and make any recommendations for further consideration.
- 9.2 Based on their local knowledge Bradford West councillors are invited to offer guidance and advice for future focused Prevent work in the Bradford West constituency.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS

Bradford West Area Committee is asked to note the work undertaken in implementing the Prevent agenda in Bradford (and Bradford West), its approach to supporting vulnerable people and offer any recommendations for how work can be better targeted in the constituency.

11. APPENDICES

Appendix A - The Prevent Duty

Appendix B - West Yorkshire Counter Terrorism Local Profile

Appendix C - Roles and responsibilities of the Bradford Prevent team

Appendix D – District Prevent Plan

Appendix E - Bradford Prevent training undertaken in the Bradford West area.

Appendix F – Prevent Advisory Group Terms of Reference

Appendix G – Home Office Statistics for Quarter 1 and 2 2022

Appendix H – Yearly West Yorkshire Channel Statistics

Appendix I- PEO CONTEST report for Q1 in 2022.

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[Home](#) > [Prevent duty guidance](#)

[Home](#)

[Office](#)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office>

Statutory guidance

Revised Prevent duty guidance: for England and Wales

Updated 1 April 2021

Contents

- [A. Status and scope of the duty](#)
- [B. Introduction](#)
- [C. A risk-based approach to the Prevent duty](#)
- [D. Monitoring and enforcement](#)
- [E. Sector-specific guidance](#)
- [F. Glossary of terms](#)



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This publication is available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance/revised-prevent-duty-guidance-for-england-and-wales>

Guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.

A. Status and scope of the duty

Statutory guidance issued under section 29 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

1. Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (the Act) places a duty on certain bodies (“specified authorities” listed in Schedule 6 to the Act), in the exercise of their functions, to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. This guidance is issued under section 29 of the Act. The Act states that the authorities subject to the provisions must have regard to this guidance when carrying out the duty.
2. The list of specified authorities subject to the provisions can be found in Schedule 6 to the Act. Further details can be found in the sector-specific sections of this guidance.
3. The duty applies to specified authorities in England and Wales, and Scotland. Counter terrorism is the responsibility of the UK Government. However, many of the local delivery mechanisms in Wales and Scotland, such as health, education and local government, are devolved. We will ensure close cooperation with the Scottish and Welsh Governments in implementing the Prevent duty where there are interdependencies between devolved and non-devolved elements. There is separate guidance for specified authorities in Scotland.
4. The duty does not confer new functions on any specified authority. The term “due regard” as used in the Act means that the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions. This purpose of this guidance is to assist authorities to decide what this means in practice.

B. Introduction

5. The Prevent strategy, published by the Government in 2011, is part of our overall counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The aim of the Prevent strategy is to reduce the threat to the UK from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. In the Act this has simply been expressed as the need to “prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”.
6. The 2011 Prevent strategy has three specific strategic objectives:

- respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it
- prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support
- work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that we need to address.

7. Terrorist groups often draw on extremist ideology, developed by extremist organisations. Some people who join terrorist groups have previously been members of extremist organisations and have been radicalised by them. The Government has defined extremism in the Prevent strategy as: “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces”.

8. The Prevent strategy was explicitly changed in 2011 to deal with all forms of terrorism and with non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists then exploit. It also made clear that preventing people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism requires challenge to extremist ideas where they are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups. And the strategy also means intervening to stop people moving from extremist (albeit legal) groups into terrorist-related activity.

9. Our Prevent work is intended to deal with all kinds of terrorist threats to the UK. The most significant of these threats is currently from terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq, and Al Qa’ida associated groups. But terrorists associated with the extreme right also pose a continued threat to our safety and security.

10. Islamist extremists regard Western intervention in Muslim-majority countries as a ‘war with Islam’, creating a narrative of ‘them’ and ‘us’. Their ideology includes the uncompromising belief that people cannot be both Muslim and British, and that Muslims living here should not participate in our democracy. Islamist extremists specifically attack the principles of civic participation and social cohesion. These extremists purport to identify grievances to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution.

11. The white supremacist ideology of extreme right-wing groups has also provided both the inspiration and justification for people who have committed extreme right-wing terrorist acts.

12. In fulfilling the duty in section 26 of the Act, we expect all specified authorities to participate fully in work to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. How they do this, and the extent to which they do this, will depend on many factors, for example, the age of the individual, how much interaction they have with them, etc. The specified authorities in Schedule 6 to the Act are those judged to have a role in

protecting vulnerable people and/or our national security. The duty is likely to be relevant to fulfilling other responsibilities such as the duty arising from section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

13. This guidance identifies best practice for each of the main sectors and describes ways in which they can comply with the duty. It includes sources of further advice and provides information on how compliance with the duty will be monitored. Sector-specific guidance for Further Education and Higher Education institutions subject to the Prevent duty has been published separately and should be read alongside this guidance.

C. A risk-based approach to the Prevent duty

14. In complying with the duty all specified authorities, as a starting point, should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area, institution or body. This risk will vary greatly and can change rapidly; but no area, institution or body is risk free. Whilst the type and scale of activity that will address the risk will vary, all specified authorities will need to give due consideration to it.

15. There are three themes throughout the sector-specific guidance, set out later in this document: effective leadership, working in partnership and appropriate capabilities.

Leadership

16. For all specified authorities, we expect that those in leadership positions:

- establish or use existing mechanisms for understanding the risk of radicalisation
- ensure staff understand the risk and build the capabilities to deal with it
- communicate and promote the importance of the duty; and
- ensure staff implement the duty effectively.

Working in partnership

17. Prevent work depends on effective partnership. To demonstrate effective compliance with the duty, specified authorities must demonstrate evidence of productive co-operation, in particular with local Prevent co-ordinators, the police and local authorities, and co-ordination through existing multi-agency forums, for example Community Safety Partnerships.

Capabilities

18. Frontline staff who engage with the public should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it. They need to be aware of what we mean by the term “extremism” and the relationship between extremism and terrorism (see section B, above).

19. Staff need to know what measures are available to prevent people from becoming drawn into terrorism and how to challenge the extremist ideology that can be associated with it. They need to understand how to obtain support for people who may be being exploited by radicalising influences.

20. All specified authorities subject to the duty will need to ensure they provide appropriate training for staff involved in the implementation of this duty. Such training is now widely available.

Sharing information

21. The Prevent programme must not involve any covert activity against people or communities. But specified authorities may need to share personal information to ensure, for example, that a person at risk of radicalisation is given appropriate support (for example on the Channel programme). Information sharing must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and is governed by legislation. To ensure the rights of individuals are fully protected, it is important that information sharing agreements are in place at a local level. When considering sharing personal information, the specified authority should take account of the following:

- necessity and proportionality: personal information should only be shared where it is strictly necessary to the intended outcome and proportionate to it. Key to determining the necessity and proportionality of sharing information will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public;
- consent: wherever possible the consent of the person concerned should be obtained before sharing any information about them;
- power to share: the sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a power to do so, in addition to satisfying the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998;
- Data Protection Act and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality: in engaging with non-public bodies, the specified authority should ensure that they are aware of their own responsibilities under the Data Protection Act and any confidentiality obligations that exist.

22. There may be some circumstances where specified authorities, in the course of Prevent-related work, identify someone who may already be engaged in illegal terrorist-related activity. People suspected of being involved in such activity must be referred to the police.

D. Monitoring and enforcement

23. All specified authorities must comply with this duty and will be expected to maintain appropriate records to show compliance with their responsibilities and provide reports when requested.

Central support and monitoring

24. The Home Office currently oversees Prevent activity in local areas which have been identified as priorities for this programme, and will provide central monitoring for the new duty. The Home Office shares management (with local authorities) of local Prevent co-ordinator teams.

25. The Home Office will:

- draw together data about implementation of Prevent from local and regional Prevent co-ordinators (including those in health, further and higher education), the police, intelligence agencies and other departments and inspection bodies where appropriate;
- monitor and assess Prevent delivery in up to 50 Prevent priority areas;
- maintain contact with relevant departments and escalate issues to them and inspectorates where appropriate;
- support the Prevent Oversight Board, chaired by the Minister for Immigration and Security, which may agree on further action to support implementation of the duty.

26. Where a specified body is not complying with the duty, the Prevent Oversight Board may recommend that the Secretary of State use the power of direction under section 30 of the Act. This power would only be used when other options for engagement and improvement had been exhausted. The power would be used only to ensure the implementation and delivery of the Prevent duty. It is also capable of being exercised in respect of Welsh specified authorities, and would be used following consultation with Welsh Ministers.

Inspection regime in individual sectors

27. Central support and monitoring will be supported by existing inspection regimes in specific sectors. Not every specified authority has a suitable inspection regime and in some areas it may be necessary to create or enhance existing regimes.

28. We will work with the Welsh Government on Prevent monitoring arrangements and provide support to Welsh inspection regimes as required.

E. Sector-specific guidance

Local authorities

29. With their wide-ranging responsibilities, and democratic accountability to their electorate, local authorities are vital to Prevent work. Effective local authorities will be working with their local partners to protect the public, prevent crime and to promote strong, integrated communities.

Specified local authorities

30. The local authorities that are subject to the duty are listed in Schedule 6 to the Act. They are:

- a county council or district council in England;
- the Greater London Authority;
- a London borough council;
- the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a local authority;
- the Council of the Isles of Scilly;
- a county council or county borough council in Wales; and
- a person carrying out a function of an authority mentioned in section 1 (2) of the Local Government Act 1999 by virtue of a direction made under section 15 of that Act

31. Other local authorities, including stand-alone fire and rescue authorities, are not listed in the Act and are not subject to the duty, but it is anticipated, considering their wider prevention role, that in many areas they will be partners in local efforts to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.

32. In fulfilling the new duty, local authorities, including elected members and senior officers should be carrying out activity in the following areas.

Partnership

33. Local authorities should establish or make use of an existing local multi-agency group to agree risk and co-ordinate Prevent activity. Many local authorities use Community Safety Partnerships but other multi-agency forums may be appropriate.

34. It is likely that links will need to be made to other statutory partnerships such as Local Safeguarding Children Boards Safeguarding Adults Boards, Channel panels and Youth Offending Teams.

35. It will be important that local or regional Prevent co-ordinators have access to senior local authority leadership to give advice and support. 36. We expect local multi-agency arrangements to be put in place to effectively monitor the impact of

Prevent work.

37. Prevent work conducted through local authorities will often directly involve, as well as have an impact on local communities. Effective dialogue and coordination with community based organisations will continue to be essential.

Risk assessment

38. We expect local authorities to use the existing counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs), produced for every region by the police, to assess the risk of individuals being drawn into terrorism. This includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit. [Guidance on CTLPs is available here \(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118203/counterterrorism-local-profiles.pdf\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118203/counterterrorism-local-profiles.pdf).

39. This risk assessment should also be informed by engagement with Prevent co-ordinators, schools, registered childcare providers, universities, colleges, local prisons, probation services, health, immigration enforcement Youth Offending Teams and others, as well as by a local authority's own knowledge of its area.

40. We would expect local authorities to incorporate the duty into existing policies and procedures, so it becomes part of the day-to-day work of the authority. The duty is likely to be relevant to fulfilling safeguarding responsibilities in that local authorities should ensure that there are clear and robust safeguarding policies to identify children at risk. This guidance should be read in conjunction with other relevant safeguarding guidance, in particular [Working Together to Safeguard Children \(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/working-together-to-safeguardchildren\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/working-together-to-safeguardchildren).

Action plan

41. With the support of co-ordinators and others as necessary, any local authority that assesses, through the multi-agency group, that there is a risk should develop a Prevent action plan. This will enable the local authority to comply with the duty and address whatever risks have been identified.

42. These local action plans will identify, prioritise and facilitate delivery of projects, activities or specific interventions to reduce the risk of people being drawn into terrorism in each local authority. Many of these projects and activities will be community based.

Staff training

43. Local authorities will be expected to ensure appropriate frontline staff, including those of its contractors, have a good understanding of Prevent are trained to recognise vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism and are aware of available programmes to deal with this issue.

44. Local authority staff will be expected to make appropriate referrals to Channel (a programme which provides support to individuals who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism which is put on a statutory footing by Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015) and ensure that Channel is supported by the appropriate organisation and expertise. [Guidance on the Channel programme can be found here \(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/%0Achannel-guidance\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/%0Achannel-guidance)

Use of local authority resources

45. In complying with the duty we expect local authorities to ensure that publicly-owned venues and resources do not provide a platform for extremists and are not used to disseminate extremist views. This includes considering whether IT equipment available to the general public should use filtering solutions that limit access to terrorist and extremist material.

46. We expect local authorities to ensure that organisations who work with the local authority on Prevent are not engaged in any extremist activity or espouse extremist views.

47. Where appropriate, we also expect local authorities to take the opportunity when new contracts for the delivery of their services are being made to ensure that the principles of the duty are written in to those contracts in a suitable form.

Collaboration between areas

48. In two-tier areas, county and district councils will need to agree proportionate arrangements for sharing the assessment of risk and for agreeing local Prevent action plans. It is expected that neighbouring areas will also agree proportionate arrangements for sharing the assessment of risk and for agreeing local Prevent action plans as appropriate.

Prevent priority areas

49. The Home Office will continue to identify priority areas for Prevent-related activity. Priority areas will, as now, be funded to employ a local Prevent co-ordinator to give additional support and expertise and additional Home Office grant funding is available for Prevent projects and activities. The Home Office will continue to have oversight of local Prevent co-ordinators and the funding, evaluation and monitoring of these projects.

Other agencies and organisations supporting children

50. A range of private and voluntary agencies and organisations provide services or, in some cases, exercise functions in relation to children. The duty applies to those bodies, which include, for example, children's homes and independent fostering agencies and bodies exercising local authority functions whether under voluntary delegation arrangements or via the use of statutory intervention powers. These bodies should ensure they are part of their local authorities' safeguarding

arrangements and that staff are aware of and know how to contribute to Prevent-related activity in their area where appropriate. Out-of-school settings supporting children

51. Many children attend a range of out-of-school settings other than childcare including supplementary schools, and tuition centres to support home education. These settings are not regulated under education law. Local authorities should take steps to understand the range of activity and settings in their areas and take appropriate and proportionate steps to ensure that children attending such settings are properly safeguarded (which should include considering whether children attending such settings are at risk of being drawn into extremism or terrorism). In assessing the risks associated with such settings, local authorities should have regard to whether the settings subscribe to voluntary accreditation schemes and any other evidence about the extent to which the providers are taking steps to safeguard the children in their care. Where safeguarding concerns arise, local authorities should actively consider how to make use of the full range of powers available to them to reduce the risks to children, including relevant planning and health and safety powers.

Monitoring and enforcement

52. In fulfilling its central monitoring role (section D above) the Home Office can (and already does) scrutinise local Prevent action plans, project impact and overall performance. It will also consider work with local authority 'peers' to provide targeted assistance and help authorities develop good practice.

53. The Government anticipates that local authorities will comply with this duty and work effectively with local partners to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Where there are concerns about compliance, the Government may need to consider the appropriateness of using existing mechanisms such as section 10 of the Local Government Act 1999. This allows the Secretary of State to appoint an inspector to assess an authority's compliance with its statutory "best value" duty in relation to one or more of the specified functions.

54. If the Secretary of State is satisfied that a council in England has failed to discharge its "best value" duty in relation to the new Prevent duty, it would be open to him to use his powers under Section 15 of the Local Government Act 1999 to intervene. This could include requiring the council to undertake specific actions, appointing Commissioners and transferring some of the council's functions to them. The Secretary of State must consult the council before issuing a direction. The Secretary of State may also direct a local inquiry to be held into the exercise by the authority of specified functions. Welsh Ministers' powers of intervention in relation to a Welsh council that has failed to discharge its "improvement" duties are set out in the Local Government (Wales) Measure 2009.

55. If the Secretary of State is satisfied that a local authority is failing to perform any function relating to education, childcare or children's social care to an adequate standard he may use his powers under section 497A or the Education Act 1996 (applied to childcare under section 15(3) of the Children's Act, and children's social care under section 50(1) of the Children Act 2004) to take

whatever action is deemed expedient to achieve necessary improvement. In Wales, Welsh Ministers have the power to intervene under the School Standards and Organisation (Wales) Act 2013. These intervention measures are considered in cases where Ofsted inspections (or Estyn in Wales) identify inadequate practice and serious concerns about practice in relation to safeguarding, adoption and lookedafter children. The Care and Social Services Inspectorate Wales (CSSIW) has a role here in terms of care settings and standards.

56. In addition to the powers above, the Act provides the Secretary of State with the power to issue a direction where a local authority has failed to discharge the duty (see paragraph 26, above).

Schools and registered childcare providers (excluding higher and further education).

57. In England about eight million children are educated in some 23,000 publicly-funded and around 2,400 independent schools. The publiclyfunded English school system comprises maintained schools (funded by local authorities), and academies (directly funded by central government. In Wales, over 450,000 children attend Local Authority maintained schools, and there are 70 independent schools.^{[footnote 1](#)}

58. All publicly-funded schools in England are required by law to teach a broad and balanced curriculum which promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils and prepares them for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of life. They must also promote community cohesion. Independent schools set their own curriculum but must comply with the Independent School Standards, which include an explicit requirement to promote fundamental British values as part of broader requirements relating to the quality of education and to promoting the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils. These standards also apply to academies (other than 16-19 academies), including free schools, as they are independent schools. 16-19 academies may have these standards imposed on them by the provisions of their funding agreement with the Secretary of State.

59. In Wales, independent schools set their own curriculum, but must comply with Independent Schools Standards made by the Welsh Ministers. These Standards also include a requirement to promote the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils.

60. Early years providers serve arguably the most vulnerable and impressionable members of society. The Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS) accordingly places clear duties on providers to keep children safe and promote their welfare. It makes clear that to protect children in their care, providers must be alert to any safeguarding and child protection issues in the child's life at home or elsewhere (paragraph 3.4 EYFS). Early years providers must take action to protect children from harm and should be alert to harmful behaviour by other adults in the child's life.

61. Early years providers already focus on children's personal, social and emotional development. The Early Years Foundation Stage framework supports early years providers to do this in an age appropriate way, through ensuring children learn right from wrong, mix and share with other children and value other's views, know about similarities and differences between themselves and others, and challenge negative attitudes and stereotypes.

62. This guidance should be read in conjunction with other relevant guidance. In England, this includes Working Together to Safeguard Children, Keeping Children Safe in Education and Information Sharing: HM government advice for professionals providing safeguarding services to children, young people, parents and carers.

[Working together to safeguard children](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/%0Aworking-together-to-safeguard-children)

(<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/%0Aworking-together-to-safeguard-children>)

[Keeping children safe in education](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/%0Akeeping-children-safe-in-education)

(<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/%0Akeeping-children-safe-in-education>)

63. In Wales it should be read alongside [Keeping learners safe](https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2018-11/keeping-learners-safe-the-role-of-local-authorities-governing-bodies-and-proprietors-of-independent-schools-under-the-education-act-2002.pdf#radicalisation)

(<https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2018-11/keeping-learners-safe-the-role-of-local-authorities-governing-bodies-and-proprietors-of-independent-schools-under-the-education-act-2002.pdf#radicalisation>). ^[footnote 2]

64. The authorities specified in paragraph 65 below are subject to the duty to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Being drawn into terrorism includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit. Schools should be safe spaces in which children and young people can understand and discuss sensitive topics, including terrorism and the extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge these ideas. The Prevent duty is not intended to limit discussion of these issues. Schools should, however, be mindful of their existing duties to forbid political indoctrination and secure a balanced presentation of political issues. These duties are imposed on maintained schools by sections 406 and 407 of the Education Act 1996. Similar duties are placed on the proprietors of independent schools, including academies (but not 16-19 academies) by the Independent School Standards.

Education and childcare specified authorities

65. The education and childcare specified authorities in Schedule 6 to the Act are as follows:

- the proprietors^[footnote 3] of maintained schools, non-maintained special schools, maintained nursery schools, independent schools (including academies and free schools) and alternative provision academies^[footnote 4]
- pupil referral units

- registered early years childcare providers⁵
- registered later years childcare providers⁶
- providers of holiday schemes for disabled children
- persons exercising local authority functions under a direction of the Secretary of State when the local authority is performing inadequately; and
- persons authorised by virtue of an order made under section 70 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 to exercise a function specified in Schedule 36A to the Education Act 1996.

66. In fulfilling the new duty, we would expect the specified authorities listed above to demonstrate activity in the following areas.

Risk assessment

67. Specified authorities are expected to assess the risk of children being drawn into terrorism, including support for extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology. This should be based on an understanding, shared with partners, of the potential risk in the local area.

68. Specified authorities will need to demonstrate that they are protecting children and young people from being drawn into terrorism by having robust safeguarding policies in place to identify children at risk, and intervening as appropriate. Institutions will need to consider the level of risk to identify the most appropriate referral, which could include Channel or Children's Social Care, for example. These policies should set out clear protocols for ensuring that any visiting speakers – whether invited by staff or by children themselves – are suitable and appropriately supervised.

Working in partnership

69. In England, governing bodies and proprietors of all schools and registered childcare providers should ensure that their safeguarding arrangements take into account the policies and procedures of the Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB). In Wales, Local Service Boards provide strategic oversight.

Staff training

70. Specified authorities should make sure that staff have training that gives them the knowledge and confidence to identify children at risk of being drawn into terrorism, and to challenge extremist ideas which can be used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups. They should know where and how to refer children and young people for further help. Prevent awareness training will be a key part of this.

IT policies

71. Specified authorities will be expected to ensure children are safe from terrorist and extremist material when accessing the internet in school, including by establishing appropriate levels of filtering.

Monitoring and enforcement

72. The Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) inspects the specified authorities in England listed above, with the exception of some privately funded independent schools. When assessing the effectiveness of schools, Ofsted inspectors already have regard to the school's approach to keeping pupils safe from the dangers of radicalisation and extremism, and what is done when it is suspected that pupils are vulnerable to these. Maintained schools are subject to intervention, and academies and free schools may be subject to termination of their funding agreement, if they are judged by Ofsted to require significant improvement or special measures, or if they fail to take the steps required by their local authority, or for academies or free schools by the Secretary of State pursuant to their funding agreement, as applicable, to address unacceptably low standards, serious breakdowns of management or governance or if the safety of pupils or staff is threatened. In Wales, all publicly funded schools are inspected by Estyn.

73. Ofsted inspects 16-19 academies under the Common Inspection Framework for further education and skills.

74. Privately funded independent schools in England are inspected by Ofsted or one of three independent inspectorates. In Wales, Estyn inspects independent schools. If they fail to meet the Independent School Standards, they must remedy the problem or be subject to regulatory action by the Department for Education or the Welsh Government, which could include de-registration (which would make their continued operation unlawful).

75. Early education funding regulations in England have been amended to ensure that providers who fail to promote the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance for those with different faiths and beliefs do not receive funding from local authorities for the free early years entitlement.

76. Ofsted's current inspection framework for early years provision reflects the requirements in the Statutory Framework for the Early Years Foundation Stage.

The health sector

77. Healthcare professionals will meet and treat people who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Being drawn into terrorism includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit.

78. The key challenge for the healthcare sector is to ensure that, where there are signs that someone has been or is being drawn into terrorism, the healthcare worker is trained to recognise those signs correctly and is aware of and can locate

available support, including the Channel programme where necessary. Preventing someone from being drawn into terrorism is substantially comparable to safeguarding in other areas, including child abuse or domestic violence.

79. There are already established arrangements in place, which we would expect to be built on in response to the statutory duty.

Health specified authorities

80. The health specified authorities in Schedule 6 to the Act are as follows:

- NHS Trusts
- NHS Foundation Trusts

81. NHS England has incorporated Prevent into its safeguarding arrangements, so that Prevent awareness and other relevant training is delivered to all staff who provide services to NHS patients. These arrangements have been effective and should continue.

82. The Chief Nursing Officer in NHS England has responsibility for all safeguarding, and a safeguarding lead, working to the Director of Nursing, is responsible for the overview and management of embedding the Prevent programme into safeguarding procedures across the NHS.

83. Each regional team in the NHS has a Head of Patient Experience who leads on safeguarding in their region. They are responsible for delivery of the Prevent strategy within their region and the health regional Prevent co-ordinators (RPCs).

84. These RPCs are expected to have regular contact with Prevent leads in NHS organisations to offer advice and guidance.

85. In Wales, NHS Trusts and Health Boards have CONTEST Prevent leads and part of multi-agency structures where these are in place. This guidance should be read in conjunction with Building Partnerships-Staying Safe issued by the Department of Health and Social Services, which provides advice to healthcare organisations on their role in preventing radicalisation of vulnerable people as part of their safeguarding responsibilities.

86. In fulfilling the duty, we would expect health bodies to demonstrate effective action in the following areas.

Partnership

87. All Sub Regions within the NHS should, under the NHS England Accountability and Assurance Framework, have in place local Safeguarding Forums, including local commissioners and providers of NHS Services. These forums have oversight of compliance with the duty, and ensure effective delivery. Within each area, the RPCs are responsible for promoting Prevent to providers and commissioners of NHS services, supporting organisations to embed Prevent into their policies and procedures, and delivering training.

88. We would expect there to be mechanisms for reporting issues to the National Prevent sub board.

89. We would also expect the Prevent lead to have networks in place for their own advice and support to make referrals to the Channel programme.

90. Since April 2013 commissioners have used the NHS Standard Contract for all commissioned services excluding Primary Care, including private and voluntary organisations. Since that time, the Safeguarding section of the contract has required providers to embed Prevent into their delivery of services, policies and training. This should now be bolstered by the statutory duty.

Risk assessment

91. All NHS Trusts in England have a Prevent lead who acts as a single point of contact for the health regional Prevent co-ordinators, and is responsible for implementing Prevent within their organisation. To comply with the duty, staff are expected, as a result of their training, to recognise and refer those at risk of being drawn into terrorism to the Prevent lead who may make a referral to the Channel programme. Regional health Prevent co-ordinators are able to provide advice and support to staff as required. In Wales, Health is a member of the Wales Contest Board and similar arrangements are in place.

Staff training

92. The intercollegiate guidance, Safeguarding Children and Young people: roles and competences for health care staff includes Prevent information and identifies competencies for all healthcare staff against six levels.

93. The training should allow all relevant staff to recognise vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism, (which includes someone with extremist ideas that are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups), including extremist ideas which can be used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups, and be aware of what action to take in response, including local processes and policies that will enable them to make referrals to the Channel programme and how to receive additional advice and support.

94. It is important that staff understand how to balance patient confidentiality with the duty. They should also be made aware of the information sharing agreements in place for sharing information with other sectors, and get advice and support on confidentiality issues when responding to potential evidence that someone is being drawn into terrorism, either during informal contact or consultation and treatment.

95. We would therefore expect providers to have in place:

- Policies that include the principles of the Prevent NHS guidance and toolkit, which are set out in [Building Partnerships, Staying Safe: guidance for healthcare organisations](#)

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/215253/dh_131912.pdf

- A programme to deliver Prevent training, resourced with accredited facilitators;
- Processes in place to ensure that using the intercollegiate guidance, staff receive Prevent awareness training appropriate to their role; and
- Procedures to comply with the Prevent Training and Competencies Framework.

Monitoring and enforcement

96. Within the NHS, we expect local safeguarding forums, including local commissioners and providers of NHS Services to have oversight of fulfilling the duty and ensuring effective delivery.

97. Externally, Monitor is the sector regulator for health services in England ensuring that independent NHS Foundation Trusts are well led so that they can provide quality care on a sustainable basis. The Trust Development Authority is responsible for overseeing the performance of NHS Trusts and the Care Quality Commission is the independent health and adult social care regulator that ensures these services provide people with safe, effective and high quality care. In Wales, the Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, and the Care and Social Services Inspectorate Wales could be considered to provide monitoring arrangements. We will work with the Welsh Government to consider the arrangements in Wales.

98. We are considering whether these internal arrangements are robust enough to effectively monitor compliance with the duty or whether the duty should be incorporated into the remit and inspection regimes of one of the existing health regulatory bodies, or another body.

Prisons and probation

99. As an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice, the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) is responsible for protecting the public and reducing re-offending through delivery of prison and probation services.

100. There are 122 prisons in England and Wales including 14 prisons operated under contract by private sector organisations. There are around 85,000 prisoners in custody at any one time and 150,000 individuals in custody during a 12 month period.

101. Probation services are delivered by the National Probation Service (NPS), which supervises high-risk and other serious offenders, and 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs), which supervise low and medium-risk offenders. NOMS is currently responsible for around 220,000 offenders under probation supervision, subject either to community sentences or to licence conditions after release from custody.

102. This responsibility for public protection and reducing re-offending gives both prisons and probation services a clear and important role both in working with offenders convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offences and in preventing other offenders from being drawn into terrorism and the extremist ideas that are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups.

Criminal justice specified authorities

103. The criminal justice specified authorities listed in Schedule 6 to the Act are as follows:

- prisons and Young Offender Institutions (YOI), including those that are contracted out;
- the under-18 secure estate (under-18 YOI, Secure training centres and Secure care homes);
- secure training centres;
- the National Probation Service; and
- Community Rehabilitation Companies.

Prisons

104. NOMS manages the risk of offenders being drawn into, or reverting to, any form of offending as part of its core business (identifying and managing the risks presented by offenders).

105. To comply with the duty we would expect public and contracted out prisons to carry out activity in the following areas.

Preliminary risk assessment

106. Prisons should perform initial risk assessments on reception, including cell-sharing risk assessments, and initial reception and induction interviews to establish concerns in relation to any form of extremism, be that faith based, animal rights, environmental, far right, far left extremism or any new emerging trends.

107. Contact with prisons chaplaincy should take place, as an integral part of the induction process. Any concerns raised as a result of chaplaincy contact with prisoners, including any concerns about extremism, should be reported throughout the sentence.

108. Prisoners should have regular contact with trained staff who will report on behaviours of concern.

109. Appropriate information and intelligence sharing should take place, for example with law enforcement partners, to understand whether extremism is an issue and to identify and manage any behaviours of concern.

Assessing ongoing risk and interventions

110. For offenders convicted of terrorist or terrorist-related offences, mainstream offender management processes will be used to determine whether interventions are necessary. These are intended to challenge the index offence and can include, where appropriate, intervention disruption and relocation.

111. Where concerns around someone being drawn into terrorism (which includes someone with extremist ideas that are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups) are identified, either during the early days in custody or later, prison staff should report accordingly, through the intelligence reporting system. All such reporting should be regularly assessed by specialist staff in conjunction with the police.

112. Where such concerns are identified an establishment should look to support that individual. This could take the form of moving them away from a negative influence or providing them with mentoring from the relevant chaplain providing religious classes or guidance.

113. Management actions could also include a reduction in privilege level, anti-bullying intervention, adjudication or segregation. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to provide theological, motivational and behavioural interventions.

114. Intelligence and briefing packages targeted at staff working with terrorist and extremist prisoners and those at risk of being drawn into terrorism should continue to be made available and delivered. These should continue to be jointly delivered by appropriately trained prison staff and police, and will be updated as required. In complying with this duty, extremism awareness training provided to new staff should be increased.

Transition from custody to supervision in the community

115. Pre-release planning should take place for all prisoners, including those subject to sentences less than 12 months, who will now receive some level of post-release supervision. Prisons, probation providers and the police should consider what risks need to be managed in the community including those that have arisen whilst in custody and indicate a vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism. Where this is the case, a Channel referral will be considered as part of the risk management plans and a referral to Channel made at the earliest opportunity where appropriate.

116. For offenders already convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offences, prisons will complete appropriate pre-release processes such as Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) with relevant agencies including the police and the NPS. These processes ensure that the requirements of the duty are met in the management of terrorist offenders in the community with the NPS the lead agency in MAPPA for such cases.

117. For all prisoners, where sufficient remaining sentence time permits, a formal multi-agency meeting which includes the police and the probation counter terrorism lead, should take place to inform decisions after release. This will ensure that

partner agencies work together to share relevant information and put provision in place to manage the risk or any outstanding concerns This can apply to periods of Release on Temporary Licence, Home Detention Curfew as well as eventual release on licence.

118. Where insufficient time remains, police and probation staff should be given fast time briefing by prison counter-terrorism staff as above and the National Probation Service CT lead will ensure the probation provider in the community is aware of the information, the risks and relevant personnel within partner agencies.

Staff training

119. In complying with the duty, we would expect all new prison staff to receive Prevent awareness training (tailored specifically to the prison environment). For staff already in post, this should be provided through specialist training and briefing packages that cover working with extremist behaviour. This training can be delivered in partnership with the police and be available to those members of staff who work most closely with terrorist and identified extremist prisoners. All staff should have an understanding of general intelligence systems, reporting and procedures to enable them to report on extremist prisoners and those vulnerable to extremist messaging.

Under-18 secure estate

120. The under-18 secure estate differs in terms of governance and service provision to that of the prisons and probation services for adults.

121. The Youth Justice Board (YJB) has a statutory responsibility to commission secure services for children and young people under the age of 18 and has a statutory duty to place children and young people sentenced or remanded by the courts into secure establishments.

The under-18 secure estates consists of:

- **Secure Children's Homes (SCHs)** Secure children's homes are run by local authority children's services, overseen by the Department of Health and the Department for Education. They have a high ratio of staff to young people and are generally small facilities, ranging in size from six to forty beds.
- **Secure Training Centres (STC)** Secure training centres are purpose-built centres for young offenders up to and including the age of 17. They are run by private operators under contracts, which set out detailed operational requirements. There are currently three STCs in England.
- **Young Offender Institutions (YOI)** Young offender institutions are facilities run by both the Prison Service and the private sector and can accommodate 15 to 21-year-old male offenders.

122. We would expect that staff at each secure estate and Youth Offending Teams (YOT) overseeing the care of the child or young person would receive appropriate training in identifying and managing those at risk of being drawn into terrorism.

123. As part of the ongoing care and monitoring of each child or young person, any indication of risk should be identified and a referral made to Channel if appropriate

Probation

124. To comply with the duty we would expect all providers of probation services, particularly the National Probation Service (NPS) and Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) to demonstrate that they are delivering activities under all of the following categories.

Leadership

125. We would expect every NPS division to have a designated probation counter-terrorism lead (PCTL) to provide the leadership necessary at a regional level to ensure processes for identifying, assessing and managing high-risk terrorist offenders are followed. We would expect PCTLs to provide a consultative role to CRCs.

Partnerships

126. In all partnership working we would expect that all providers of probation services will comply with the duty; for example both the NPS and CRCs are partners in local Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs). Active participation in CSPs will enable all probation providers to work together with other partners to share information and develop joint referrals and interventions.

Risk assessment

127. We would expect probation staff to adopt an investigative stance in undertaking risk assessments as they should in all cases. Where there are concerns, albeit these may be intelligence led, about someone being at risk of being drawn into terrorism this should initially be recorded in the core risk assessment.

128. Additionally, we would expect existing risk assessment processes to be supplemented by specialist assessments, for example, extremism risk screening. We would expect PCTLs to provide a consultative role to CRCs in doing this, where appropriate.

129. For offenders already convicted of terrorist or terrorist-related offences we would expect the NPS to work in partnership with other agencies, including prisons and the police, to manage any risks identified via MAPPA and to provide bespoke interventions where relevant. For offenders who have not been convicted of a terrorism-related offence and may not be MAPPA eligible, but who are subsequently at risk of being drawn into terrorism, we would expect probation

providers to have processes in place to escalate these cases to other agencies or otherwise refer the offender for appropriate interventions – for example to the Channel programme.

Staff training

130. We would expect probation providers to ensure that all staff receive appropriate training in identifying and managing those at risk of being drawn into terrorism including those with extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups. Prevent awareness training has already been given to probation staff in recent years. In complying with the duty, we expect this and other relevant Prevent training to continue.

131. In the future, we expect Prevent awareness training to be included within the Probation Qualification Framework, which is completed by all newly qualified probation staff in both the NPS and CRCs. In addition PCTLs should lead the development of, for example, faith awareness or Extremism Risk Screening training of local training and staff development to supplement the Prevent awareness training. This should focus on emerging issues and any new support and interventions that become available.

Monitoring and enforcement for prisons and probation

132. Within prisons, we would expect compliance with the duty to be monitored and enforced internally by:

- mandatory compliance with Prison Service Instructions and Orders which define policy and best practice; and
- regular assessment of levels and risk of extremism and radicalisation internally via regional counter-terrorism co-ordinators.

133. Externally, our preference is to use existing inspection regimes where appropriate to do so. We consider that a thematic inspection by HM Inspector of Prisons could be a useful addition to the monitoring arrangements outlined above.

134. For probation providers, internally, we would expect compliance with the duty to be reinforced by detailed operational guidance set out in Probation Instructions. CRCs are contractually required to comply with the mandatory actions in relevant Probation Instructions and a similar requirement exists for the NPS in Service Level Agreements. Compliance with Probation Instructions is monitored and assured internally by contract management and audit functions within NOMS and the Ministry of Justice

135. Externally, we consider that a thematic inspection by HM Inspector of Probation could be a useful addition to the monitoring arrangement outlined above.

136. The YJB monitors the flow of young people through the Youth Justice system identifying the needs and behaviours of young offenders working closely with local partners to improve the support available.

The police

137. The police play an essential role in most aspects of Prevent work alongside other agencies and partners. They hold information which can help assess the risk of radicalisation and disrupt people engaged in drawing others into terrorism (which includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit). The Police work alongside other sectors in this document to play a galvanising role in developing local Prevent partnerships and bring together a wide range of other organisations to support local delivery of Prevent.

138. The police are uniquely placed to tackle terrorism and whilst it is acknowledged that the Police Service will designate dedicated Prevent roles within Policing, a key objective for the police is to ensure that Prevent is embedded into all aspects of policing including patrol, neighbourhood and safeguarding functions. In fulfilment of their duties consideration must be given to the use of all suitable police resources, not just those specifically designed as Prevent.

Police specified authorities

139. The police specified authorities listed in Schedule 6 to the Act are as follows:

- police forces in England and Wales
- Police and Crime Commissioners
- the British Transport Police
- port police forces; and
- the Civil Nuclear Police Authority

140. In fulfilling the new duty we would expect the police to take action in the following areas. Prosecute, disrupt and deter extremists

141. In complying with the duty, police should engage and where appropriate disrupt extremist activity, in partnership with other agencies. We expect the police to prioritise projects to disrupt terrorist and extremist material on the internet and extremists working in this country. Officers should consider the full range of investigative and prosecution options when it comes to disrupting extremist behaviour, including the use of public order powers where appropriate. This may include:

- Enforcing terrorist proscription and public order legislation;
- Working with local authorities to consider municipal powers, including local highways and leafleting by-laws, using safeguarding of young people legislation;
- Advising other specified authorities, for example local authorities or universities, to develop venue booking processes and good practice;

- Lawfully disrupting or attending events involving extremist speakers in both private and municipal establishments;
- Providing high visibility police presence at relevant events in public places.

Supporting vulnerable individuals

142. Prevent requires a multi-agency approach to protect people at risk from radicalisation. When vulnerable individuals are identified the police will undertake the following:

- In partnership with other agencies including the local authority, consider appropriate interventions, including the Channel programme, to support vulnerable individuals;
- Work in partnership with and support Channel Panels chaired by local authorities to co-ordinate Channel partners and Channel actions;
- Support existing, and identify potential new Intervention Providers.

Partnership and risk assessment

143. The police should:

- Engage fully with the local multi-agency groups that will assess the risk of people being drawn into terrorism, providing (where appropriate) details of the police counter-terrorism local profile (CTLTP);
- Support the development and implementation by the multi agency group of a Prevent action plan to address that risk;
- Support local authority Prevent co-ordinators, regional further and higher education co-ordinators, regional health Prevent leads and regional NOMS Prevent co-ordinators in carrying out their work;
- Co-ordinate the delivery of the Channel programme by accepting referrals, including acting as a conduit for Channel referrals with partners; and
- Ensure Prevent considerations are fully embedded into counter-terrorism investigations.

144. The success of Prevent work relies on communities supporting efforts to prevent people being drawn into terrorism and challenging the extremist ideas that are also part of terrorist ideology. The police have a critical role in helping communities do this. To comply with the duty, we would expect the police, to support others including local authorities, to build community resilience by:

- Supporting local authority Prevent Coordinators in developing Prevent-related projects and action plans;
- Supporting the Charity Commission in providing guidance to avoid money being inadvertently given to organisations which may endorse extremism or terrorism and enforcing legislation where fraud offences are identified.
- Supporting opportunities to develop community challenges to extremists; and
- Collate and analyse community tension reporting across the UK that enables police and partners to identify and respond to emerging concerns.

Monitoring and enforcement

145. The Strategic Policing Requirement makes clear that Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and Chief Constables must demonstrate that they have contributed to the government's counter terrorism strategy (CONTEST). This includes the Prevent programme, where they are required to take into account the need to identify and divert those involved in or vulnerable to radicalisation. The Home Secretary can direct a PCC to take specific action to address a specific failure.

146. HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is the statutory body for inspecting the police. They can carry out thematic inspections and can be asked to inspect a particular force or theme by the Home Secretary.

F. Glossary of terms

- 'Having due regard' means that the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions.
- 'Extremism' is defined in the 2011 Prevent strategy as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.
- 'Interventions' are projects intended to divert people who are being drawn into terrorist activity. Interventions can include mentoring, counselling, theological support, encouraging civic engagement, developing support networks (family and peer structures) or providing mainstream services (education, employment, health, finance or housing).
- 'Non-violent extremism' is extremism, as defined above, which is not accompanied by violence.

- ‘Prevention’ in the context of this document means reducing or eliminating the risk of individuals becoming involved in terrorism. Prevent includes but is not confined to the identification and referral of those at risk of being drawn into terrorism into appropriate interventions. These interventions aim to divert vulnerable people from radicalisation.
- ‘Radicalisation’ refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups.
- ‘Safeguarding’ is the process of protecting vulnerable people, whether from crime, other forms of abuse or (in the context of this document) from being drawn into terrorist-related activity.
- The current UK definition of ‘terrorism’ is given in the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT 2000). In summary this defines terrorism as an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people; causes serious damage to property; or seriously interferes or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
- ‘Terrorist-related offences’ are those (such as murder) which are not offences in terrorist legislation, but which are judged to be committed in relation to terrorism.
- ‘Vulnerability’ describes the condition of being capable of being injured; difficult to defend; open to moral or ideological attack. Within Prevent, the word describes factors and characteristics associated with being susceptible to radicalisation.

-
1. Schools Census results on [Wales.gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk)
 2. Keeping Learners Safe includes advice on radicalisation on page 51
 3. Reference in this guidance to the ‘proprietor’ in the case of a maintained school, maintained nursery school and non-maintained special school is a reference to the governing body of the school.
 4. Including early years and later years childcare provision in schools that is exempt from registration under the Childcare Act 2006

[↑ Back to top](#)



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West Yorkshire Annual Counter Terrorism Local Profile

January –
December
2021



West Yorkshire Counter Terrorism Local Profile January – December 2021

Threat Level / National Picture

- For the majority of 2021 the threat to the UK from international terrorism was assessed as SUBSTANTIAL. The threat level was raised to **SEVERE, meaning an attack is highly likely** on 15th November 2021. It was raised after two terrorist incidents in the preceding month, reflecting the diverse, complex and volatile nature of the terrorist threat in the UK.
- Since March 2017, CT Policing and UK Intelligence Services have prevented 32 attacks – 18 were Islamist related, 12 Extreme Right Wing Terrorism (ERWT) and two Left, Anarchist or Single Issue Terrorism (LASIT).
- The CT policing network is currently working on a record number of more than 800 investigations. These investigations focus on a range of activities, including fundraising, radicalising and preparing acts of terrorism.
- The level of threat is complex and multi-dimensional and ranges from self initiated terrorism where individuals are intent on carrying out crude attacks to sophisticated networks pursuing ambitious and coordinated plots. The most likely attack methodologies are bladed / blunt force weapons; vehicles; and explosives. However, most of the activity we see is in other forms such as radicalising others, fundraising or preparing acts of terrorism.

****Please note that not all groups discussed in this document are of counter terrorism interest. The document should be viewed in context****

Online Extremism

- Online radicalisation of individuals is used in all forms of extremism and terrorism. Extremist and terrorist organisations have the ability to access and disseminate content globally. It is difficult to police and is therefore a persistent challenge for CT policing. The last 12 months has seen an increased shift towards the use of encrypted sites and applications to spread propaganda. Whilst the use of mainstream platforms such as Facebook and Twitter still exist, extremist activity continues to shift onto more encrypted and private communication channels. Whilst these platforms are legitimate and are not indicative of extremist / terrorist activity, lesser-known sites may be less moderated and may allow more radical types of content and discussion. This could ultimately lead to new threats in the online sphere of social media. The use of mainstream media platforms also continues to be exploited by those looking to promote their propaganda and use the online sphere to radicalise people.
- The online environment is ideal for taking advantage of peoples' vulnerabilities and encouraging / facilitating radicalisation, specifically of younger people. Due to the global pandemic, 2021 encountered continued national restrictions, this facilitated a continued increase in time spent online by the majority of the population. It is assessed that a result of the ongoing pandemic the public's attention remained focused primarily on public health threats and not those from terrorism. Online extremist activities may have consequently gone further un-noticed.
- 2021 re-emphasised how terrorist groups such as Daesh rely heavily upon their propaganda being shared online where it has the potential to reach large, diverse audiences and can be used to radicalise, encourage, support and provoke individuals to carry out attacks.

The last 12 months saw increased amounts of time spent online as a result of the ongoing pandemic. This provided those with an extremist mindset an increased opportunity to produce their own propaganda content and distribute online. Click bait and falling down a "rabbit-hole" of hyperlinks remains a possibility.

- As a result of the global pandemic 2021 saw continued emphasis on online home learning. School closures in early 2021 and school bubbles isolating has meant that we have seen a promotion of online learning for the young and potentially vulnerable by white nationalist groups such as Patriotic Alternative. This had the likely potential to increase at home radicalisation of younger people. Both in the UK and abroad, it has been highlighted that right wing groups have been created online by young people.
- February 2021 saw the launch of the new iREPORTit App. It can be used by the public to report violent extremist content online so that it can be removed via the CTIRU. This new reporting tool is slightly different to the ACT app (which provides information on what to do) and the gov.uk website which is web based and not in app format. You can anonymously report terrorist material you come across online. The project comes amid concerns that the coronavirus pandemic has created fertile conditions for isolated and vulnerable people, including children, to become radicalised.
- In July 2021 the government announced the rollout of a new text alert service to be used to warn people on their phones of life-threatening situations in their area, including terrorist attacks. The public will be sent messages on their mobile devices that will give clear guidance on how they can protect themselves when such events happen.
- 2021 also saw an online partnership between ACT (Action Counters Terrorism) and Netmums. This is an initiative to make CT advice and assistance increasingly accessible to parents of children.

Extremist Travel

- It remains unlikely that UK citizens fighting abroad will return to the UK during the next few months. Even with current reduced travel restrictions we do not foresee the attempted return of UK citizens as an imminent concern. Stricter border controls continue to hamper returnees. If anyone did attempt to return to the UK, the greatest risk is that they use a clandestine route. Small boat travel methodology is becoming more widely seen. In October 2021 it was revealed that MI6 had joined Home Office efforts to vet migrants crossing the channel for security risks. They are working alongside Border Force officials at Dover.
- With the collapse of the Caliphate in 2019 and tighter travel restrictions imposed throughout 2021 there has been no known travel by West Yorkshire residents to conflicts zones this year. Due to the ongoing world wide pandemic it is highly unlikely that individuals will travel to theatres in 2022 even as some travel restrictions begin to ease.
- In March 2021 a government watchdog reported that there would be no guarantee that the children of Daesh parents who return to the UK from Syria will not pose a threat to the public in future. So far the UK has only seen children who have returned aged under 10. However, the growing number of domestic teenagers becoming radicalised shows the risk of extremism among the young and it is impossible to know how children exposed to extremism in Syria will be affected.

Al-Muhajiroun (ALM)

ALM is a proscribed terrorist organisation in the UK which follows an extreme fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The groups objectives include the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate.

ALM's leadership advocated support of Daesh, reject fundamental British values and democracy, and support the inclusion of the UK in a Caliphate which is governed under a version of Sharia Law.

- ALM's use of the online sphere remains a risk. The effects of Covid-19 restrictions have also inhibited the group's ability to operate in public spaces. However, recent terror attacks have demonstrated that ALM messaging retains its potency long after its creation.
- Their ideology supports attack planning and members and affiliates have been involved and convicted of planning or committing terrorist offences. ALM believe that terrorist acts are justified in retaliation for the perceived persecution of Muslims.

Extremism in the Secure Estate

- There is a risk of prisoners, both TACT (those charged and sentenced with terrorist related offences) and Non-TACT (those charged and sentenced with none terrorist related offences), being radicalised in prison and radicalising others. Consequently the rehabilitation of TACT offenders remains a key area of concern both nationally and for the North East.
- The global pandemic has continued to dominated this reporting period, severely impacting prison establishments with many prison estates continuing to operate on a limited regime. Since restrictions in prisons began to ease inline with the rest of the UK intelligence reporting has risen.
- In October 2021 papers were published calling for judges to be given increased powers to sentence the most serious terror offenders to a minimum 14 year jail term with an extended period on licence for 25 years.

Self-Initiated Terrorism

- The threat from self-initiated terrorism is not linked to one specific ideology, attacks in the past have been committed by those with an Islamist and Right Wing ideology and others who have no ideology at all. Low sophistication methods of attack tend to be used, such as vehicles and knives.
 - With continued increased isolation throughout 2021 due to the global pandemic, and the potential to spend more time online, there is capacity for the SIT risk to increase. Furthermore, due to the global pandemic there is a realistic possibility that this may have had an adverse effect on people's mental health. The impact of living in isolation and not having access to the same level of support they are used to may lead to a decrease in an individual's mental health and becoming more vulnerable to extremism / terrorism.
 - During 2021 self-initiated attacks in the UK remained somewhat hampered, however, as restrictions began to ease in the later half of the year we saw the attack on Sir David Amess, MP in Leigh-On-Sea, Essex. He was stabbed to death on 15th October 2021 by Ali HARBI ALI who is believed to have acted alone although held extremist Islamic beliefs.
 - On 14th November 2021 Iraqi born Christian convert **Emad AL SWEALMEEN** detonated a homemade body worn IED in the back of a taxi outside Liverpool Women's Hospital. It is believed to have been a failed attempt and did not detonate fully. He was a failed asylum seeker who had suffered periods of mental health issues. His last failed asylum bid was in January 2021 and it is believed he began purchasing materials for the attack in April 2021. No one was killed other than the assailant, the taxi driver David Perry escaped seconds before the car exploded in flames after he heroically locked AL SWEALMEEN in the back of the car.
- It is assessed that as the UK heads towards a more normalised way of living under Plan A in 2022 and people begin to go out once more that the likelihood of a person carrying out a self-initiated attack will be increasingly probable.

Extreme Right Wing Terrorism (ERWT) / Extremist Right Wing (ERW)

This year saw the proscription of another RWT group called The Base on 12th July 2021 of The Base. The following Right Wing groups are proscribed in the UK. A full list of all proscribed organisations can be found on the following website: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2>



Sonnenkrieg
Division



Systems Resistance
Network (SRN)




Feuerkrieg
Division



National Action



Scottish Dawn



NS 131



Atomwaffen Division
aka National Socialist
Order



The Base

This year has seen UK wide restrictions ease somewhat and with this there have been more demonstrations, visits and protests recorded across the UK and in WY as was expected. It remains likely that long established groups have continued to adapt to the measures brought about from the pandemic and continue to engage in some form of online group meetings, and have more than likely continued to enhanced their online presence. In November 2021 a report by Hope Not Hate identified the top 52 areas of the UK most at risk from far right extremism, within this list was the local authority area of Bradford but it was not in the top 16 considered of most concern.

Cultural Nationalism (CN) is a belief that “Western Culture” is under threat from mass migration into Europe and from a lack of integration by certain ethnic and cultural groups. The ideology tends to focus on the rejection of cultural practices such as the wearing of the burqa or the perceived rise of the use of sharia law. In March 2021 **Stephen YAXLEY-LENNON** aka Tommy ROBINSON visited an address in Huddersfield. This was in relation to an assault and “waterboarding” incident in 2018 at Almondbury School, Huddersfield which was videoed and went viral. It attracted RW attention at the time. The victim sued YAXLEY-LENNON. This trial, which was held in July found YAXLEY-LENNON guilty and ordered him to pay £100,000 libel damages and legal costs, believed to be around £500,000.

In April 2021 five members of **Britain First** attended Batley Grammar School. The group stood outside the school and made a speech which was filmed and uploaded to their website. This was a result of the Batley teacher blasphemy row that escalated this year. In October an Islamic charity Purpose For Life was rebuked by a watchdog for naming the teacher publicly which prompted days of protests outside from Muslim parents enraged about the showing of the Prophet Mohammed cartoon.

Britain First have continued to carry out protests throughout the UK over the last year, focusing on hotels that have allegedly been housing asylum seekers. On 03/04/2021 a minibus of eight supporters attended the Travelodge, Mirfield. They entered the hotel displaying their views on the hotel for housing asylum seekers. They had banners saying “Britain First Putting British People First”.

In May a member of the **National Front** ran for election in the Calderdale borough council elections for Todmorden Ward. The candidate did not get elected. The NF describes itself as a ‘radical racial nationalist movement’ whose primary goal is ‘to ensure the survival and advancement of the White Race and the British Nation.’ No issues were reported.

In June **Jayda FRANSEN** previous leader of BF stood as an Independent candidate in the local Batley and Spen by-election in June but failed to get elected.

Extreme Right Wing Terrorism (ERWT) / Extremist Right Wing (ERW) - continued

White Nationalism (WN) - is a belief that mass migration from the “non-White” world, and demographic change, poses an existential threat to the “White Race” and “Western Culture”. Advocates for some sort of “White” homeland, either through partition of already existing countries, or by the (if necessary forced) repatriation of ethnic minorities. At the start of the year **Patriotic Alternative** was exploiting anti-lockdown sentiments amongst frustrated young teens / adults in an effort to recruit them into their cause. Thus highlighting the threat we see to young males in particular. PA hung a giant “End the lockdown” banner off the Humber Bridge and used social media accounts to spread their propaganda and messages. Youngsters are being targeted by this group within the NE region. In February PA began promoting home schooling as restrictions once again forced school closures for a period of time.

They promoted a home school curriculum perceived by many to contain racist elements. PA were also promoting themselves via public online gaming tournaments such as Call of Duty, raising concerns of the group using gaming platforms to attract new members.

In November the Yorkshire branch of PA protested in nearby Hull in response to news of alleged child abuse in the city, however they received minimal media attention.

It is assess that WN will highly likely continue to be supported in WY and attract activity in our force area and region in the course of 2022.

White Supremacism (WS) - is a belief that the “White Race” has certain inalienable physical and mental characteristics that makes it superior (with some variation) to other races. Often associated with conspiracy theories that explain the decline in “White” political and social status over the last hundred years. This can also encapsulate a belief in the spiritual superiority of the “White Race”, often describing racial differences in quasi-religious terms (such as “the Aryan soul”).

COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has continued to dominate this year. The UK was put into a third national lockdown on 6th January 2021. Emergency measures continued to limit peoples daily lives. The beginning of the COVID-19 vaccine rollout began in early December 2020 across the UK. Subsequent second doses and a booster vaccination programme throughout 2021 have ensued. As predicted, last year, we have finally begun to see a return to a more normalised way of life albeit with some cautious measures still in place. This holds the possibility of reducing the risk and threat we have seen as a direct result of the pandemic as we head into 2022.

Online

The impact of COVID-19 will present many issues for WY in years to come. CTPNE continues to work with national teams to actively engage with families where young people may be exposed to negative influences online. With schools and colleges having undergone further periods of partial closures at the beginning of 2021 and many people continuing to work from home for the majority of 2021 the impact has been an increase in the amount of time people have spent online. Vulnerabilities have had more opportunity to be preyed upon and those in isolation taken advantage of. It has also presented increased opportunity for people to self radicalise in the home. Here the danger lies in self-initiated terrorism.

At time of writing we are under Plan A with most national restrictions now removed. Educational establishments are open and the mandate to work from home has been rescinded. However, the continued increased time spent online whilst restrictions to work from home were in place and whilst some forms of schooling remain online (particularly for those self isolating / home schooling) there remains the issue of increased risk. People have potentially put themselves at greater risk of online radicalisation and / or of being taken advantage of particularly if there is no alternative mind-set or counter narrative on offer in the home, at school or from family for example.

The use of social media to disseminate COVID-19 booster vaccine misinformation continues to cause issue as it did with the initial vaccine rollouts earlier in 2021. In March 2021 Facebook launched a media literacy campaign to tackle the spread of false information about the COVID-19 vaccine. Whilst not of an immediate CT concern, over the last year we have seen the right wing in particular use conspiracy theories etc. to prey on peoples vulnerabilities. This shows how vaccine misinformation could also be used to recruit and spread right wing propaganda.

Right Wing / Far Right

Far right groups have continued to use conspiracy theories about COVID-19 as a recruiting tool to attract younger supporters into their realms during 2021. The use of memes and conspiracy theories are attractive to a particularly younger audience and have been used to attract new support.

The evacuation of thousands of Afghan refugees to the UK in 2021 after Kabul fell to the Taliban triggered an increase in far-right groups targeting hotels across the UK where they are being accommodated, arguing that funding should go towards rehousing the UK homeless. This was arguably facilitated with relaxed national restrictions over the summer months. Groups have also claimed the Afghan resettlement scheme will lead to increased unemployment amongst British workers.

Mental Health

It is likely that mental health of WY has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. It is assessed that mental illness will continue to play a large role in Prevent referrals seen in 2022 as it remains unknown what affect the underlying health issue contributes to a person's vulnerability to radicalisation.

Emerging Vulnerabilities

Drones

The use of drones as a terrorist method remains a wider UK threat. It is another method which terrorist may adopt as technologies advance and monitoring of human targets continues. With the number of personal drones increasing in the UK despite new laws being implemented it is not uncommon to see these fly over critical and sensitive sites (intentionally or not). Internationally terrorists have used drones for a variety of purposes such as surveillance to dropping improvised explosive devices, Daesh have also published the use of drones in propaganda material in recent years. Drones can increase the number of casualties / victims and could potentially be used as a substitute for suicide bombers and reach places with more ease. Drones could for example be used to carry chemical and biological weapons as well as explosives. They can also cover a large geographical scope making them attractive to potential extremists when attack planning. They can be operated remotely and evade air defence systems. The UK Government has in place legislation which gives the police the power to stop and search drone pilots near airports.

3D Printed Firearms

In the UK 3D printing is legal but it is illegal to construct a viable, homemade firearm, including 3D printed designs. However, the threat posed from 3D printed firearms is increasing due to improved printing techniques and accessibility of products. Recent developments in 3D printing have improved the capacity and power of available designs, which is likely to make them more attractive for use in crime and, potentially, terrorist attacks.

With reducing costs of 3D printers making them more affordable, cheaper running costs and wider availability these factors will likely facilitate greater usage increasing the potential threat of them being mis-used for printing firearms.

Threats to MPs

In the wake of the murder of MP Sir David Amess, a terrorist incident, the protection of MPs has again been highlighted as an emerging threat. Media reporting has linked the suspect, 25 year old **Ali HARBİ ALI**, to the preaching's of ALM leader Anjem CHOUDARY. On 21st October 2021 HARBİ ALI was charged with murder under the Terrorism Act. It is claimed he is affiliated to IS and was planning an attack for several years. He was charged with preparing acts of terrorism. CT and Non CT policing remain vigilant to the threat against MPs.





Hamas

On 19th November 2021 the UK Government proscribed the political wing of Islamist group **Hamas** in the UK denouncing it as “fundamentally and rabidly antisemitic”. The military wing of Hamas has been proscribed in the UK since 2001. Supporters of the group in its entirety will face up to 10 years in prison under the Terrorism Act.

School Massacre Attacks – Columbine School Shooting 25th Anniversary

As the 25th anniversary of the Columbine massacre approaches (2024) it is likely we will see increased reference to the event and possible imitation desires for copycat school massacre style attacks. In September 2021, in the US, four teenagers were charged with a plot to attack Pennsylvania high school in 2024 on the anniversary date. At one of the teens houses was found a Molotov cocktail, bomb components, bomb making instructions, lists of guns, ammunition and tactical equipment. It goes to show that the threat of potential copycat style attacks remains.

Links and Resources

Anti Terrorist Hotline	 <p>ANTI-TERRORIST HOTLINE 0800 789 321 Your call could save lives</p>	You can report suspicious activity by contacting the police in confidence on 0800 789 321. In an emergency, or if you need urgent police assistance, you should always dial 999.
Act Early Campaign	 <p>ACT ACTION COUNTERS TERRORISM</p>	Report online: https://actearly.uk/
Crime Stoppers	 <p>CRIMESTOPPERS 0800 555 111 Call anonymously with information about crime</p>	Report anonymously by telephone 0800 555 111 or online https://crimestoppers-uk.org/give-information/forms/pre-form
Prevent Referrals	 <p>COUNTER TERRORISM POLICING</p>	<p>All information must be sent to your local Fixed Intelligence Management Unit (FIMU). To do this please utilise the mechanisms that are currently in place in your local area:</p> <p>Partners – complete a Prevent referral form and send to FIMU Police – submit an intelligence form</p>

Roles and responsibilities in Prevent in Bradford

Role	Responsibilities
Prevent Coordinator	<p>The Coordinator oversees the Prevent strategy and the Prevent programme in the Bradford district. They are instrumental in creating and maintaining partnerships across the district and engaging with sectors and communities to better understand their concerns and the risks related to extremism and radicalisation.</p> <p>The Coordinator provides support and guidance, as well delivering training and programmes across the district. They work with Elected Members, Council Officers at all levels of the organisation, senior representatives of other agencies, private sector and community organisations, to raise awareness of the various Prevent related risks in our society and how we can build counter narratives to these. Training is offered in how to have difficult conversations, the dangers of fake news and conspiracy theories and also on how to build critical thinking. Training is also offered on the different emerging extremism/ terrorism risks in our society.</p> <p>Strong partnerships mean that the Coordinator has a strong awareness of the Prevent related risks in our society. They use this knowledge to bid for funding from the Home Office. They ensure that this funding is spent on resources, projects and events that target the main Prevent related risks in our society and build resilience towards extremist narratives. They also ensure that the Prevent team is supporting and facilitating this work and adding to it with their own expertise and knowledge.</p> <p>The Coordinator has developed a Prevent Champions network which is growing steadily and shares good practise and resources across the district.</p> <p>The Coordinator is an active member of the Channel Panel and provides advice and support to partners</p>

	<p>across the district with regard to Prevent safeguarding matters.</p>
<p><u>Prevent Education Officer</u></p>	<p>The Prevent Education Officer (PEO) is responsible for supporting schools and all education establishments and those that work with young people, in fulfilling their Prevent Duty.</p> <p>They deliver Prevent training to schools, Children’s Homes and Youth Worker staff across the district. They also deliver various training packages to staff and pupils regarding how to have difficult conversations with young people, the importance of critical thinking, the dangers of fake news and conspiracy theories, as well as workshops for students transitioning to secondary school.</p> <p>PEOs are instrumental in sourcing, designing and distributing resources for PSHE to build resilience to hate crime, extremist narratives and radicalisation. They provide advice and support to school staff to ensure that young people are provided with the opportunities and resources to explore ideas and understand the risks in our society and how they can protect themselves online and in everyday life. They also provide advice on the Prevent Duty in schools and how schools can best meet this in their policies, procedures and curriculum</p> <p>The PEO provides advice and training to schools and educational establishments regarding safeguarding the young people in their care and have an excellent collaborative relationship with schools, many of whom are part of our Prevent Champions network. This relationship means that they have an excellent understanding of the Prevent related issues in our schools and are able to advise on projects and support from Home Office funding that will meet these issues.</p>
<p>Prevent Engagement Officer</p>	<p>The Prevent Engagement Officer is instrumental in working with partners across the district to understand and gauge community sentiment. They work with local</p>

	<p>communities, voluntary and faith organisations to strengthen their understanding of Hate Crime and Prevent and safeguarding work and build trust and confidence in local structures designed to challenge hate and extremism.</p> <p>The Engagement Officer organises local roundtable events to engage with communities across the district. These events help the Prevent team to understand local sentiment and work with communities to raise awareness of risk and share the work that is going on across the district to combat this.</p> <p>The Engagement Officer also works with mosques and madrassas across the district, helping in the delivery of Prevent training and raising awareness of the hate crime and Prevent related risks in our society.</p> <p>Our strong community links mean that Home Office funded projects are delivered across the district. The Engagement Officer is instrumental in ensuring that these projects target the appropriate risks and are being delivered well and meeting their objectives.</p> <p>The Engagement Officer engages local councillors, making them aware of activity within their ward and they identifying appropriate community training programmes which will help build resilience and increase the capacity for communities to engage with others of a different background.</p>
<p>Business Support Officer (part time)</p>	<p>The Business Support Officer supports the Prevent team with their data and administration tasks to ensure that the District Prevent Plan is delivered smoothly. They provide support with data collection, budgets, administration and statistics to ensure that training, projects and workshops are delivered effectively and in a timely and professional manner.</p>

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Bradford District Prevent Plan 2020-22

Activities	Lead Officer/Organisations	Expected Milestone/Outcomes	Performance Measure	CTLP Priorities	Completion Of Actions
1. EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP					
1.1 Review CONTEST Governance arrangements in line with amendments to national policies and ensure effective linkage to relevant District Partnerships and Strategies.	CONTEST Silver partners	<p>Strengthen CONTEST performance management to ensure effective leadership is provided to partners</p> <p>Membership and terms of reference are appropriate and effective.</p> <p>Partnership groups are aligning national policies with local delivery plan.</p> <p>Effective leadership arrangements which builds resilience to the influence of terrorist narratives in the district.</p>	<p>Full recorded partnership buy-in into delivery groups</p> <p>Four Silver and thirteen Channel meetings per year</p> <p>Terms of reference updated where appropriate</p> <p>New LA CONTEST created with T of R and buy in across LA to ensure that Prevent Plan targets are being fulfilled and regularly reported on</p>	Links to all priorities to have effective governance arrangements and to link in to district partnerships and strategies	Ongoing as appropriate
1.2 Lead the risk assessment process and ensure partners are fully sighted on key risk issues	West Yorkshire Police.	<p>An annual CTLP is produced that partners feed into and quarterly updates are also produced and communicated to all partners.</p> <p>CTLP is for West Yorkshire but each area has own plan that is RAG rated.</p> <p>Partnership actions respond directly to current risk.</p> <p>Response to changes in risk are fluent and prompt</p>	<p>CTLP is used to shape District Prevent Plan and Risk Assessment.</p> <p>Threat and risk briefings are provided to partners on a regular basis.</p> <p>Prevent self-assessment audits provided to partners.</p> <p>Progress on these is reported at quarterly CONTEST meetings.</p>	Links in to all CTLP priorities	Ongoing- CTLP is produced quarterly and communicated to partners. The updated CTLP has been disseminated- Q 1 and 2 to date. Risk updates are being delivered to partners, based

on this. Up to Sept 2021 delivered to projects, ward officers, education safeguarding, safeguarding adults, housing partners, domestic abuse and a session is planned for Oct with elected Members.

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1.3 Prevent is accountable to local democratic processes – formal reports made to elected members through Corporate Overview and Scrutiny Committee

Bradford MDC

Transparency and accountability through existing democratic processes

Elected members understand the Prevent agenda, are engaged and support delivery locally.

Attend one O/S committee per year
At least two members' training sessions per year or more, according to local need.
Quarterly update on Prevent work provided for elected members.

Links to all CTLP priorities

O/S meeting attended in March 2020 and elected members invited to Independent Review.
Elected members training in October.

1.4 Partnership and Safeguarding Boards are updated on threat and risk and ensure Prevent safeguarding processes are built into existing district policies and programmes

Safeguarding Adults Board (SAB) and Bradford Safeguarding Childrens Board (BSCB)
Safer Communities Partnership Board

Safeguarding Board role is integrated into Prevent delivery so that Prevents' role in protecting vulnerable people is widely recognised as a 'safeguarding' function.

Agenda itemised for Prevent on partnership Boards and/or briefing provided.

Boards deliver Prevent related initiatives within their work programme

Links to all CTLP priorities

Ongoing throughout the year. Prevent has been agenda item at meetings.
Presented to both Boards in June and also at Safeguarding Week- did a presentation

1.5 Review of Channel processes

Bradford MDC

Regular training and support for members.

An action plan is in place to respond to any

Links to all CTLP priorities

Channel assurance

to ensure systems are fluent and support is appropriate and effective		Updated Terms of Reference and review of action plan.	recommendations made and agreed at Contest Silver. Review of action plan and progress according to targets, reported on.		statement has been completed and shared with Home Office-based on new Channel guidance. Next Channel training in May 2021. Channel on a Page information has been created and shared with all partners to ensure that all areas know how to refer. Channel training from Solutions Not Sides and Mencap have taken place. Following a review of Channel processes, a Channel closure letter and also a Channel consent letter have been added to the documentation that all Channel users must have.
1.6 Education Leaders across Early Years, Schools, Further and Higher	Bradford MDC	Young people recognise divisive extreme narratives and have the knowledge and skills to build resilience against hate based groups and individuals.	Dedicated Prevent Education Officer to support safeguarding arrangements and education programmes	Links to all CTLP priorities, especially those risks particularly targeted	Ongoing throughout the year. Autumn term-

education are supported to deliver appropriate anti-extremism education

Teaching and support staff recognise risks and understand reporting arrangements and their responsibilities regarding Prevent delivery and reporting.

Schools share their experience and knowledge with each other to build capacity within the education sector.

All schools and educational establishments consulted about their Prevent needs and Prevent offer based on these and also data from Prevent referrals and queries.

Audits designed and circulated to all educational establishments to support schools in their Prevent responsibilities.

Continue to build the Prevent Champions network so that it has members across the district in all education sectors.

Deliver a Prevent Champions event to share good practise across the education sector and forge links between schools

PEO to attend Headteacher partnership groups and DSL networks to ensure Prevent is high on their agenda.

towards the young, such as online safety, the increased risks due to COVID 19 and the growth of specific types of extremism.

PEO consults schools about their needs and bases the Prevent offer on these and the data from referrals. Audits are also circulated.

PEO attends Headteachers' events where applicable.

Extensive training undertaken in Summer term for all schools.

Prevent Champions event in Spring/ Summer term if possible.

PEO is on Headteacher partnership groups and DSL network meetings and will be delivering a Prevent update.

Bradford District Prevent Plan

Activities	Lead Officer/Organisations	Expected Outcomes	Performance Measure	CTLP Priorities	Completion of Actions
2. SAFEGUARDING					
2.1 Clear reporting/ responsibility arrangements to Adult and Children's Safeguarding Boards	Bradford MDC/ West Yorkshire Police	<p>Safeguarding boards are clear as to their role and responsibilities in Prevent delivery.</p> <p>Safeguarding Boards are integrating Prevent into their core functions and programmes.</p>	<p>Identified in West Yorkshire Safeguarding Procedures</p> <p>Deliver Prevent training sessions to both boards.</p> <p>Deliver Prevent sessions as part of future Safeguarding Week content.</p> <p>Develop a Prevent Champions network in adults and children's safeguarding.</p> <p>Continue to identify Prevent related training for safeguarding staff, as part of our established training programme for LA staff.</p>	Links to all CTLP priorities	<p>Safeguarding week June 2021.</p> <p>Prevent is identified in West Yorkshire S/G procedures.</p> <p>Prevent sessions were delivered to both boards in June.</p> <p>A Prevent session was delivered as part of Safeguarding week in June 2021.</p>
2.2 Current generic Safeguarding packages include recognising radicalisation and hate	Bradford MDC	Wider recognition of Prevent as a safeguarding role and where this sits alongside other safeguarding risks	Prevent safeguarding on Evolve and mandatory in LA training	Links to all CTLP priorities	Coordinator has met with CMT and agreed that Prevent training will be on generic

narratives as standard					training package for all LA staff. Coordinator currently in talks with EVOLVE to ensure this is happening.
2.3 Trigger plans are in place to manage the range of circumstances in which any returnees from a conflict zone may arrive in the District, so that children can be safeguarded.	Bradford MDC/West Yorkshire Police	Forward planning mitigates risk and ensures children are catered for in the most sensitive and effective way. The risk of extremism and radicalisation locally from returnees is understood, reduced and support plans are in place	An action plan that utilises local safeguarding procedures is in place. This is plan is ongoing and updated as required.	Links to CTLP priority regarding Syrian returnees and putting plans in place to deal with this, should it happen	Plan is completed and ready to be activated if necessary.
2.4 Support the effective and efficient delivery of the Channel support scheme.	Bradford MDC/ West Yorkshire Police	An effective and efficient Channel process with a broad range of partners who can meet the needs of those at risk within our district. Support to ensure that those partners are well briefed on current risk and Prevent- related issues. In built review of good practise.	13 Channel safeguarding panels per year. Yearly review of Channel/Prevent safeguarding processes. Recorded broad Channel membership across all sectors. Record of review of previous good practise and a 'lessons learned' template for all cases leaving Channel.	Links to all CTLP priorities	Ongoing process with monthly meetings and thorough record keeping, reviews and training processes.
2.5 Referrals to Channel are appropriate and proportional and submitted across a range of sectors	Bradford MDC	Greater confidence in the Channel process. Risk is managed effectively and referrals are signposted correctly.	An increased number of referrals are heard at Channel Safeguarding Panel. Tracking of referrals shows representation across sectors. Monthly review of referrals that don't make Channel and changes made to Prevent training as necessary.	Links to all CTLP priorities	Ongoing. Currently working in partnership with CT Police to target area that haven't routinely been targeted before such as gyms

2.6 Increased support to mental health sector to recognise and respond to issue of radicalisation and hate narratives	Bradford MDC	<p>Greater understanding and support for those with mental health issues who become vulnerable to an extremist hate narrative</p> <p>A Mental Health practitioner attends Channel Panel meetings.</p> <p>More knowledge, awareness and support for those working with people with mental health concerns</p>	<p>Increase in links with the mental health support hub for advice and support.</p> <p>Deliver well attended Prevent training sessions for mental health professionals around current Prevent issues and the links to mental health.</p>	Links to CTLP- Mental health risks	Sessions delivered to mental health professionals throughout 2021.
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Bradford District Prevent Plan

Activities	Lead Officer/Organisations	Expected Outcomes	Performance Measure	CTLP Priorities	Completion of Actions
3. ENGAGEMENT / RAISING AWARENESS					
3.1 BMDC Prevent Team to be a point of contact for support and advice to all sectors and agencies to deliver to district Prevent objectives and meet requirements of the Prevent Duty	Bradford MDC	Support is available and accessible to all. All sectors know where to get support from.	<p>'Prevent Champion' network grows in membership across all sectors.</p> <p>There are quarterly Prevent Champion information events concerning the latest Prevent guidance and information.</p> <p>A regularly updated Prevent webpage on Bradford Council site.</p> <p>Termly newsletter for schools and circulation of relevant guidance documents to all sectors</p>	This will link to all CTLP priorities as it will ensure that all sectors and agencies have a point of contact to receive information and training on risk across the district. The network, webpage and newsletter will focus on the key risks in our area and ensure that information on this is up to date.	Quarterly events for Champions. Termly newsletters for schools. Regularly updated webpages.
3.2 Build engagement,	Bradford MDC	Empowered	Deliver Prevent awareness	Links to all CTLP	Four community

consult and raise awareness with communities on Prevent project delivery. Support and nurture community based solutions		communities identifying appropriate solutions that will be effective at ground level	training, relevant to communities, to every constituency in Bradford. Engage the Community Support project to deliver four community based outreach sessions. Set up a Prevent Consultation Group and meet quarterly around Prevent related issues.	priorities and makes sure that all areas of the district are consulted and made aware of the specific risk areas within the district such as self-initiated terrorism, online threats, ALM, ERWT, Syria returnees and extremism in the secure estate	based outreach session by March 2022. First one in Sept 2021 Community training offered to all constituencies by March 2022. Quarterly PAG meeting, starting October 2021.
3.3 Run a series of 'Prevent Roundtables' for community audiences who wish to find out more and contribute to Prevent delivery	Bradford MDC	Trust and confidence is increased in local Prevent delivery	Five area based community roundtables per year and include local elected members	Links to all CTLP priorities and ensures that members of the public are consulted about future planning and also makes sure that they are fully informed about the current risks in our district.	5 sessions to be completed by the end of March 2022. First one Sept 2021
3.4 Develop a 'Community Engagement Strategy' to engage with groups and individuals who wish for dialogue around Prevent and related subjects	Bradford MDC	Any concerns from communities are taken into account. Communities understand how work to challenge extremist hate narratives is delivered. Prevent is understood better and misconceptions are minimised.	Create a Prevent Consultation Group who meet on a quarterly basis and consult them on matters related to Prevent in our District. Strategy approved by CONTEST structure Strategy includes measures of numbers of people positively engaged in Prevent	Links to all CTLP priorities, particularly helping to raise awareness of risk amongst the local community and ensuring that they are fully aware of all new and emerging risks such as self-initiated terrorism, online threats, ALM, ERWT, Syria returnees and extremism in the secure estate.	Strategy created Group meet every quarter. First meeting Oct 2021
3.5 Develop a network of	Bradford MDC/ West	More effective	Annual event and training for	Links to all CTLP	Annual Prevent

operational Prevent leads across the District and provide a training and support programme	Yorkshire Police	information and communication systems – earlier and more effective detection of vulnerability	operational Prevent leads Health, local authority, police, education and probation represented in Prevent Champions Network. Online signposting and guidance Create opportunities for Prevent Champions to cascade their knowledge to others in their sectors. Plan events in education, Police and health.	priorities and provides a mechanism whereby these can be disseminated throughout the district, via Prevent Champions. Ensuring that the specific risks within our district are communicated to those who are Prevent leads so that all risks are considered and addressed.	Champion event for operational Prevent Leads. Annual events as practical for education, health and police.
3.6 Engage young people to educate and support challenge of extremist hate narratives	Bradford MDC	Young people are more resilient to hate narratives and able to challenge them. Young people are able to cascade their knowledge and build Prevent related capacity within the education system	At least one project every year to focus on young people and any related Prevent risk. Develop peer champions in all Prevent Champion schools. Organise an event each year for peer champions to share good practise across the district and learn new things to disseminate at school. Deliver Prevent related sessions as needed, to match risk analysis according to Prevent referral data.	Particularly focuses on CTLP risks that involve young people such as the online threat and single issues risks that are exacerbated by use of the online space, such as left wing/ anarchist viewpoints. Also focus on self-initiated terrorism, ALM, ERWT, Syria returnees and extremism in the secure estate	At least one project by end of 2021 and one March 2022. All Prevent Champion schools to have peer champions by March 2021 and one event to share good practise by end 2021.
3.7 Develop and deliver in partnership with the third sector a range of projects that meet local Prevent Objectives		Risks and vulnerabilities are reduced against identified threat	Independent Prevent projects delivered across sectors and across the District according to need. Need evidenced in application process.	Addresses all CTLP risks including self-initiated terrorism, online threats, ALM, ERWT, Syria returnees and extremism in the secure estate	Prevent projects completed by March 2021 and March 2022.
3.8 An analysis on	Bradford MDC	Delivery reaches all key	Identified in Prevent	Addresses all CTLP	Completed by March

agency Prevent engagement		areas	Engagement Strategy	risk.	2022
3.9 Review arrangements for use of Council facilities to ensure that venues are not being used to promote hatred or extremist viewpoints	Bradford MDC	Prevent / Safeguarding leads are assured that proportionate arrangements are in place to prevent the organisations resources from being used to support those who to promote hatred or extremist viewpoints	Review takes place and guidance produced Monitoring arrangements are established and operational	Addresses ALM, Far Right and Extreme Right, Left Wing/ Anarchist and single issues threats. Any groups that would use a venue to speak to an audience rather than just relying on the online space.	Guidance updated by October 2021.
3.10 Update and distribute guidance to Mosques and Islamic institutions should they be contacted by a far right/ extremist group	Bradford MDC	Increased confidence from communities that they are being protected from extremists and that they have the most up to date guidance and information.	Update is created, taking into account all the latest advice and information. Distribute update to all District Islamic Institutions and Mosques	Addresses CTLP risk from Far and Extreme Right wing groups.	Guidance produced and disseminate.
3.11 Ensure organisations and statutory partners hosting external speakers are aware of responsibilities to have robust equal opportunities policies which challenge hate speech, racism and homophobia	Bradford MDC/West Yorkshire Police	Bradford District is an increasingly difficult place for extremist speakers to deliver speeches / lectures	External speaker policy disseminated to all statutory partners. On-line support and guidance is available and advertised for all venues in the district. Organisations are approached if external speakers of concern are using venues and a plan is followed to offer support and guidance.	Addresses ALM, Far Right and Extreme Right, Left Wing/ Anarchist and single issues threats. Any groups that would use a venue to speak to an audience rather than just relying on the online space.	Guidance updated by September 2021.

Bradford District Prevent Plan					
Activities	Lead Officer/Organisations	Expected Outcomes	Performance Measure	CTLP Priorities	Completion of Actions
4. TRAINING/ COMMUNICATIONS					
4.1 Continue to support a network of Prevent trainers across the District to deliver quality and appropriate safeguarding training	Bradford MDC	Appropriate training leads to good delivery of safeguarding and education work to undermine extremist hate narratives	WRAP TTT is undertaken every quarter so that all organisations have the opportunity to have one person qualified to deliver appropriate Prevent training to staff. Trainers are recorded and sent updates on key Prevent issues and developments..	All CTLP priorities will be addressed in the training as they will be used to inform on risk.	WRAP TTT offered every term.
4.2 Create an updated Prevent Communications Strategy	Bradford MDC	Increase transparency around Prevent delivery and help build trust and confidence in the agenda.	Strategy approved by CONTEST Silver	All CTLP priorities addressed.	Created and approved by CONTEST Silver by end Jan 2021.
4.3 Updated training programme for Prevent/CONTEST groups and operational Prevent leads across the District, incorporating key current issues and risks. .	Bradford MDC	Operational and Strategic Leads understand risk and vulnerabilities and are equipped with knowledge/skills to make effective decisions	An updated menu of Prevent training to be circulated across the district, including online and face to face training.	All CTLP priorities will be addressed in the training as they will be used to inform on risk.	Menu created and disseminated by March 2021. Changes to menu as year has progressed include some sessions from Solutions Not Sides to address tensions regarding the situation in Israel/ Palestine. Also some sessions in schools from Votes For Schools following their return after lockdown and the increased desire for young people to have discussions around key extremist related incidents.

4.4 Training and engagement for key Council political groups	Bradford MDC	Local political awareness and buy-in	At least one member's training session per year, according to need.	All CTLP priorities will be addressed in the training as they will be used to inform on risk.	Members training session booked for October 2021
4.5 Provide Prevent briefings to local authority Tier 4 Managers	Bradford MDC	Increased referrals to Channel from Local Authority	2 sessions for Tier 4 Managers	All CTLP priorities will be addressed in the training as they will be used to inform on risk.	Briefing to Tier 4 managers by end of 2021.
4.6 Support organisations with IT equipment available to the general public to consider using filtering solutions that limit access to terrorist and extremist material	BMDC/West Yorkshire Police	Increased difficulty in accessing extremist material at public access points	Update and issue guidance according to most recent information.	All CTLP priorities will be addressed in the training as they will be used to inform on risk.- particularly the online risk.	Created and disseminated by March 2021.

Bradford District Prevent Plan					
Activities	Lead Officer/Organisations	Expected Outcomes	Performance Measure	CTLP Priorities	Completion of Actions
5. ON-LINE RESILIENCE					
5.1 Engage a range of partners to consider the nature of the on-line threat and develop a plan that tackles the key threats around online radicalisation.	Bradford MDC	As a district we are focusing more resource to online threat and are agile to its quickly evolving nature	Meet as a group every quarter to create a plan and share new and upcoming online threats. Create an online site where help, support and resources can be stored and publicise it amongst all our partners.	Particularly focuses on the online risk and how different groups manipulate the online space for their benefit.	Start meetings by end Q1 2021. Create online site by end of Summer term 2021.
5.2 Education programme to explore propaganda, conspiracy theories and develop critical thinking in the district.	Bradford MDC and project providers	As a district, our community becomes more aware and resilient to propaganda, conspiracy theories and develops their critical thinking skills, so they	Sessions delivered to elected members, parents, young people and members of the community.	Particularly focuses on the online risk and how different groups manipulate the online space for their benefit.	Delivered by end of 21/22 school year.

		are less likely to be susceptible to online extremism.			
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Bradford Prevent Advisory Group (BPAG)

Terms of Reference

Draft

1) Background

Prevent is a distinct part of the Government's Counter Terrorism Strategy, CONTEST. It focuses on early intervention through strategies which reduce the likelihood of individuals supporting a violent extremist ideology or becoming terrorists. The aim of the *Prevent* strategy is to reduce the threat to the UK from all forms of terrorism, by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

Bradford Council and partners have always sought to tailor the Prevent programme to the needs of the District's communities, providing grass roots projects to help build resilience and to ensure support is offered to vulnerable people of all ages and backgrounds. We have continued to make efforts to engage communities and elected members and to build awareness of and engagement in the programme. This has been welcomed by all.

The programme in Bradford has been made transparent with local Prevent Delivery Plans being made available to the public. There has also been significant engagement with the local democratic framework via regular reports to the Corporate Overview and Scrutiny Committee.

To further increase our transparency and accountability we have decided to establish an Advisory Group consisting of local representatives, community leaders and lay people. The group will assist in reviewing, discussing and advising on the effectiveness of current work to protect vulnerable people being drawn into terrorism and make recommendations for future work.

This will allow local communities to contribute ideas on delivering effective work in their neighbourhoods and increase trust in the Prevent.

2) Group Aims/Objectives

- To meet twice a year to help support, advise and improve delivery of the Bradford Prevent Team's work
- Provide a sounding board, acting as 'critical friends', whilst partaking in discussions and contributing advice to help the Bradford Prevent Team to understand the potential impact of projects and other activity on communities
- Actively share information circulated by the Bradford Prevent Team widely with communities and partners, and relaying information, concerns and tensions back to the Bradford Prevent Team
- There are many misconceptions around Prevent and the BPAG will provide a forum for

community members to hear what delivery actually looks like on the ground and contribute to making the Bradford District a safer place to live.

3) Roles and Responsibilities

- Advisors are not answerable to the Bradford Prevent Team they are truly independent
- Advisors are encouraged to engage with individuals and communities who are diverse from themselves, below are some non-exhaustive suggestions:
 - Alternative religion or belief system to their own or organisation that they represent;
 - Different sex, gender, alternative sexuality or lifestyle from their own;
 - Different age group from their own generation;
 - People with special needs, disabilities that they do not have;
 - Different socio-economic range to their own;
 - Different profession or employment;
- Bradford Prevent Team expects that advisors will pro-actively seek the views and opinions outside of their existing organisation/profession and work cooperatively with other advisors.
- Advisors will be encouraged to build relationships and have an ongoing dialogue to gather the views from a diverse group and in some cases engage with groups who have contrary opinions, viewpoints and lifestyles to their own.
- The group will be supported by staff from the Bradford Prevent Team

4) Office Bearers

- The group will elect a chair and vice chair who will be supported by the Bradford Prevent Team staff to run the order of business for each meeting. Notes will be taken for each meeting.

5) Attendance

- Members of the advisory groups are expected to attend two meetings per twelve month period and involve themselves in other wider Prevent activity as agreed at meetings.
- The group may agree to invite visitors/others to meetings to inform the work of the group

6) Declaration of Interest

All declarations of interest and/or conflict of interest should be announced and recorded at the beginning of each meeting

7) Meeting Arrangements

We will hold two meetings every twelve months to be agreed by the group with the location to be agreed by the group. Each meeting should consist of at least five group members

8) Meeting Basic Conduct

- Members are asked to respect each other's opinions and direct comments and questions via the acting chair person.
- To ensure confidentiality on items during meetings. No content of the meetings shall be divulged to any second parties unless the group has made a decision to do so or someone is at risk of significant harm.
- All meetings will be serviced by Bradford Council.
- All phones should be turned to silent during meetings.
- Notes shall be taken of each meeting.
- Notes shall be a brief record of the meeting.
- Notes and papers for all regular meetings shall be circulated no later than one week before the next meeting via e-mail wherever possible.

9) Dissolution

- The group will be affective for the period of the Prevent Programme. The group will not hold any monies. Any responsibility of the group will be passed to the Local Authority should it dissolve, with the creation of any new entity agreed by the Local Authority.

Umar Hayat

July 2021

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[Home](#) > [Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2020 to March 2021](#)

[Home](#)

[Office](#)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office>

Official Statistics

Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021

Updated 18 November 2021

Applies to England and Wales

Contents

- [1. Introduction](#)
- [2. People referred to the Prevent programme](#)
- [3. Demographics](#)
- [4. Regional trends](#)
- [5. Further information](#)



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This publication is available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-england-and-wales-april-2020-to-march-2021>

This release contains Experimental Statistics **on individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme** due to concerns they were vulnerable to a risk of radicalisation. Following initial screening and assessment, referrals may be passed to a multi-agency 'Channel panel' where a risk of radicalisation exists. Chaired by Local Authorities, these panels determine the extent of an individual's vulnerability to radicalisation and whether a tailored package of support is necessary and proportionate to address the vulnerabilities.

Key results

In the year ending 31 March 2021, there were 4,915 referrals to Prevent. This is a decrease of 22% compared to the previous year (6,287) and the lowest number of referrals received since comparable data are available (year ending March 2016). This decrease is likely to have been driven by the effects of public health restrictions that were in place throughout the year to control the spread of the COVID-19 virus.

The Police made the highest number of referrals (1,770; 36%), followed by the Education sector (1,221; 25%). The year ending 31 March 2021 saw the lowest proportion of referrals received from the Education sector since comparable data are available, likely due to the closure of schools and universities as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.


As in previous years, where gender was specified (4,913), most referrals were of males (4,316; 88%).

Of the referrals where age of the individual was known (4,883), those aged 15 to 20 accounted for the largest proportion (1,398; 29%).

The number of referrals discussed at a Channel panel (1,333) and adopted as a Channel case (688) saw smaller reductions compared with the previous year, decreasing by 7% and 0.6% respectively.

Of the 688 Channel cases, the most common were cases referred due to concerns regarding Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation (317; 46%), followed by those with a mixed, unstable or unclear ideology (205; 30%) and concerns regarding Islamist radicalisation (154; 22%).

Proportion of Prevent referrals adopted as a Channel case, years ending March 2016 to 2021



1. Introduction

Prevent forms part of the Government's wider counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST. Prevent aims to safeguard people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. For more information, please see the following publications on the GOV.UK website: [Prevent duty guidance](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance>), [Channel duty guidance](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-duty-guidance) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-duty-guidance>) and [2018 CONTEST strategy](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018>).

1.1 Coverage of this release

This release contains Experimental Statistics on the number of individuals recorded as having been referred to and supported through the Prevent programme in England and Wales, from 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2021. The statistics cover their journey from referral to adoption as a case, broken down by demographic statistics and geography.

Experimental Statistics are Official Statistics undergoing development. Work is underway to improve the level of consistency in recording Prevent referrals across different regions in England and Wales. More information about Experimental Statistics can be found on the [UK Statistics Authority website](https://uksa.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/about-the-authority/what-we-do/uk-statistical-) (<https://uksa.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/about-the-authority/what-we-do/uk-statistical->

[system/types-of-official-statistics/](#)). The Home Office aims to improve the quality of data recording and assurance procedures so that these statistics can be designated as National Statistics in future years. For example, Home Office analysts have been working with policy colleagues to develop further guidance for Channel Case Officers and update the training programme available to them. Please see [the user guide \(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/user-guide-to-individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-england-and-wales\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/user-guide-to-individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-england-and-wales) for these statistics for further information.

More detailed tables relating to this release can be found in [the accompanying data tables \(https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2019-to-march-2020\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2019-to-march-2020). This includes data for Prevent and Channel in the years ending March 2016 to March 2021.

1.2 Identification and referrals

If a member of the public, or someone working with the public, has a concern about a person they know who may be vulnerable to the risk of radicalisation, they can raise their concerns with their Local Authority safeguarding team or the police for an assessment.

Staff working in public-facing organisations may receive training to help identify people who may be vulnerable to the risk of radicalisation, and what to do about it. Local Authorities, schools, colleges, universities, health bodies, prisons, probation organisations and the police are subject to a statutory duty through the [Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 \(https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-and-security-bill\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-and-security-bill) to include in their day-to-day work consideration of the need to safeguard people from being drawn into terrorism.

1.3 Initial assessment

The police screen all referrals to check that the individual is not already or should be part of a terrorism investigation, as these individuals are not appropriate for Channel support. Prevent referrals that may be appropriate for Channel are recorded on the Prevent Case Management Tracker (PCMT). Once this has taken place, the initial assessment may conclude that no further action is required. In other cases, a person's vulnerability may be assessed as not linked to radicalisation and they may be referred on to another form of support. All Prevent referrals are confidential and do not result in a criminal record or any other form of sanction.

1.4 The Channel programme

The Channel programme in England and Wales is an initiative that provides a multi-agency approach to support people vulnerable to the risk of radicalisation. For those individuals where the police assess there is a risk of radicalisation, a Channel panel chaired by the Local Authority, and attended by other partners such as representatives from education and health services, will meet to discuss the

referral. They will discuss the extent of the vulnerability, assess all the circumstances of the case, and decide whether to adopt the individual as a Channel case. Cases are adopted in order to further assess the vulnerability, or to provide a tailored package of support where necessary and proportionate to do so. A Channel panel may decide that a person's vulnerabilities are not terrorism-related and will refer the person to other forms of support. Information shared among partners is strictly within the terms of the Data Protection Act and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The Home Office collects, processes and shares personal information to enable it to carry out its statutory functions as part of Channel. For further information on how personal data is stored and used for the Channel programme, please refer to the [Channel Data Privacy Information Notice \(DPIN\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-data-privacy-notice/channel-data-privacy-information-notice) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-data-privacy-notice/channel-data-privacy-information-notice>).

[The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015](https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-and-security-bill)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-and-security-bill>) placed the Channel programme on a statutory footing and created a duty on each Local Authority in England and Wales to ensure there is a panel in place for its area.

[Statutory guidance for Channel panels](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance>) was published in March 2015.

1.5 Providing support and leaving the programme


Participation in the Channel programme is confidential, and consent is obtained before Channel support is provided. Many types of support are available, addressing educational, vocational, mental health and other vulnerabilities. Ideological mentoring is common. Tailored support is provided based on the needs identified for an individual. The role of the Channel panel is to coordinate new activity through statutory partners and/or Channel-commissioned Intervention Providers (IPs), or oversee existing activity depending on what is most appropriate and proportionate for the case.

A Channel panel will, on a monthly basis, review the progress of an individual in the Channel programme. The panel decides a person will leave the Channel programme when there is no further risk of radicalisation. Support to address non-radicalisation-related concerns could continue in some cases but= would be managed outside of the Channel programme.

The Local Authority or other providers may provide alternative forms of support to people who drop out of the Channel programme. In these circumstances, the police will manage any risk of terrorism they might present.

After an individual has left the Channel programme, their progress will be reviewed after 6 and 12 months. If the individual shows further radicalisation-related concerns, they can re-enter the Channel programme and receive further support.

Figure 1: Prevent process flow diagram



Source: Home Office

2. People referred to the Prevent programme

This section presents statistics on the number of referrals to Prevent due to concerns that an individual is vulnerable to radicalisation. It includes the sector of referral and information on how the individuals referred were assessed and supported, including those who required no further action, a referral to another service or were reviewed by a Channel panel for support through the Channel programme.

The data presented in this release represents activity recorded by the police and Local Authority partners. Although quality assurance is undertaken to confirm these numbers, the statistics rely on recording of information and so the overall completeness and accuracy of reported totals cannot be guaranteed. Please see [the user guide \(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/user-guide-to-individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-england-and-wales\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/user-guide-to-individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-england-and-wales) for further information.


Throughout this release, the number of referrals reported includes individuals who had been referred more than once during the year. This information is included as each referral may not contain the same information (e.g. different sector of referral or type of concern) and may not have the same outcome (e.g. signposted to

statutory partners, discussed at a Channel panel). Including multiple referrals provides a more complete picture of all support recorded and provided through the Prevent programme in the year ending March 2021.

2.1 The referral process

In the year ending March 2021, there were 4,915 referrals to Prevent due to concerns that an individual was vulnerable to radicalisation. The police made the most referrals (1,770; 36%), followed by the Education sector (1,221; 25%). Compared with the previous year, the proportion of referrals made by the police increased (1,950; 31%), whilst the proportion of referrals made by the Education sector decreased (1,928; 31%). The year ending March 2021 saw the lowest proportion of referrals received from the Education sector since comparable data are available, likely due to the closure of schools and universities as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Figure 2: Sector of referral and subsequent journey, year ending March 2021



Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021. [Table 2](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021>)

Notes:

1. HM Prison and Probation Service.
2. 'Other' includes employment, military and government (including Home Office Immigration Enforcement & HMRC), for example.
3. Referrals received that 'required no further action' include but are not limited to: individuals already receiving support through Prevent, those presenting a higher risk than can be managed by Prevent, and those who were found to have no vulnerabilities at initial assessment.
4. Individuals can be signposted after a Channel case has been closed to ensure that they continue to receive support for any non-radicalisation-related vulnerabilities.
5. Data quality checks found that in some cases, Channel Case Officers are recording that an individual has been 'signposted to a service' following case closure, when notifying the source of referral to re-refer if concerns are raised again in future. Therefore, the statistics on the number of individuals referred to alternative services may include services providing new support following case closure, and services continuing to support the individual following their exit from the Prevent programme.
6. The sum of 'Required no further action', 'Signposted to other services', and 'discussed at a Channel panel' do not equal the total number of Prevent referrals due to 28 open cases at the information gathering stage at the point of data confirmation (27 September 2021). Individuals can be signposted to statutory partners to address wider vulnerabilities depending on what the panel assess as being necessary and proportionate.
7. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Of the 4,915 **referrals** to Prevent in the year ending March 2021:

- 72% (3,554) were deemed not suitable for Channel consideration and exited the process prior to a Channel panel discussion; of which the majority were signposted to other services (2,525; 71%)
- 27% (1,333) were considered for Channel support
- Ultimately, 14% (688) were adopted as a Channel case [\[footnote 1\]](#)

Of the 2,525 referrals signposted to alternative services for support, they were most commonly directed to the Health sector (593; 23%), closely followed by the Education sector (529; 21%).

Of the 1,333 referrals deemed suitable through preliminary assessment to be **discussed at a Channel panel** in the year ending March 2021:

- 645 (48%) referrals were not adopted as a Channel case; of these, the majority (460; 71%) were signposted to alternative services^[footnote 2] where the panel deemed the individuals to have non-radicalisation-related vulnerabilities. Those not adopted and not signposted at this stage may have either been found to have no vulnerabilities, appropriate support was already in place, or they may not have consented to support.
- 688 (52%) referrals were adopted as a **Channel case**, of which most (509; 74%) of the individuals concerned have now left the Channel process; 179 (26%) remained a Channel case at time of data confirmation (September 2021).

Of the 509 referrals adopted as a **Channel case** in the year ending March 2021 that have subsequently closed, 435 (85%) of the individuals concerned exited with no further radicalisation concerns. This can include individuals:

- who had a vulnerability to radicalisation addressed by a Channel-commissioned Intervention Provider
- for whom the Channel panel oversaw existing support already in place through statutory partners
- who were adopted as a Channel case to further assess whether a vulnerability to radicalisation was present and determine whether additional support was needed

The remaining 74 referrals (15%) that were adopted as a case and have now closed, concerned individuals who either withdrew from the Channel programme (69), or were withdrawn because it was no longer deemed appropriate (5), although in some cases support from other services may still be in place. Any terrorism risk that might be present is managed by the police.


2.2 Referrals over time

In the year ending March 2021, there were 4,915 referrals to Prevent, a 22% decrease in comparison with the previous year (6,287). This decrease is likely to have been driven by the effects of public health restrictions that were in place throughout the year to control the spread of the COVID-19 virus. In Q1, during the first lockdown in England and Wales, there were 954 referrals to Prevent. This is the lowest number of referrals received in a quarter since comparable data began in the year ending March 2016, and a 39% decrease compared with the number of referrals to Prevent in Q1 of the previous year (1,575). The total number of referrals increased quarter-on-quarter to a peak of 1,599 referrals in Q3, decreasing again in Q4 to 1,234 referrals as England and Wales entered a third national lockdown.

There was a 7% decrease in the number of referrals deemed suitable through a preliminary assessment to be discussed at a Channel panel compared with the previous year (1,333 down from 1,432). However, the proportion of referrals discussed at a Channel panel increased (27%, up from 23% in the previous year).

In the year ending March 2021, 688 referrals were adopted as a Channel case, four less cases compared with the 692 referrals adopted as a case in the previous year. Similar to those discussed at panel, despite the decrease in the total number of referrals to Prevent, the proportion adopted as a Channel case also increased (14%, up from 11% in the previous year).

Figure 3: Proportion of Prevent referrals adopted as a Channel case, years ending March 2016 to 2021



Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021. [Table 1 \(https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021)

3. Demographics

This section reports statistics on the individuals referred to Prevent due to concerns about their vulnerability to the risk of radicalisation. Demographics (including age and gender) are reported according to their progression through Prevent as well as the type of concern raised.


3.1 Age

In the year ending March 2021, individuals aged 15 to 20 accounted for the largest proportion of the 4,883 **referrals** to Prevent (1,398; 29%) where age was known (Figure 4). Individuals aged 21 to 30 accounted for the second largest proportion of referrals (984; 20%) where age was known, closely followed by individuals aged under 15 (969; 20%).

Those aged 15 to 20 accounted for a larger proportion as the individuals moved through the programme, accounting for over a third of those **discussed at a Channel panel** (452; 34%) and adopted as a **Channel case** (264; 38%).

This is in line with previous data since the year ending March 2016, as individuals aged 15 to 20 have consistently accounted for most **referrals, discussions at panel** and **Channel cases**.

Figure 4: Age group from youngest to oldest of those referred, discussed at a Channel panel and adopted as a Channel case, year ending March 2021



Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021. [Table 4 \(https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021)

3.2 Age by sector of referral

The median age is the age of the middle person, when sorted from youngest to oldest. Using the median provides a good indication of the age of the ‘typical’ person referred by each sector.


Reflecting the demographic composition of the institution, **referrals** for individuals from the Education sector had the youngest median age (15 years of age). Referrals from the Community had the oldest median age (31 years). Median ages for the other sectors of referral were as follows: Local Authority (17 years), Friends & Family (21 and a half years), Other (26 years), Police (28.0), Health (28 years) and HMPPS (30 years).

3.3 Gender

In this report, we refer to gender rather than sex of individuals referred to Prevent. 'Sex' can be considered to refer to whether someone is male or female based on their physiology, with 'gender' representing a social construct or sense of self that takes a wider range of forms. However, it is likely that recording includes a mixture of physiological and personal identity.

In the year ending March 2021, of the 4,913 **referrals** where gender was specified, the majority were for males (4,316; 88%). Males also accounted for the majority of the referrals **discussed at a Channel panel** (1,210 of 1,333; 91%) and those adopted as a **Channel case** (635 of 688; 92%).

Figure 5: Gender of those referred, discussed at a Channel panel and adopted as a Channel case, year ending March 2021



Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021. [Table 5](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021)
([https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021))

[prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021](#))

Notes: The 'Unspecified' gender categories each accounted for less than 1% of referrals, Panel discussions and Channel cases.

The proportion of males at each stage of the Prevent programme has been increasing since the year ending March 2016, the earliest for which comparable data are available. However the largest increase has been in the proportion of males adopted as a Channel case. In the year ending March 2016, 85% (321 of 378) of referrals adopted as a Channel case were for males, this compares with 92% (635 of 688) in the year ending March 2021.

3.4 Type of concern

The type of concern presented is based upon information provided by the referrer. For cases that progress further into the programme, officers may update this based upon new information that comes to light as they gather further information to help them provide support tailored to the individual's need. Therefore, the statistics regarding the 'type of concern' raised, are likely to include a mix of type of concern raised by original referrer and type of concern that the Channel Case Officers believe the individual is presenting.

In the year ending March 2021, of the 4,915 referrals to **Prevent**, half (2,522; 51%) were for individuals with a mixed, unstable or unclear ideology. In line with the overall decrease in total referrals, the number of Prevent **referrals** regarding individuals with a mixed, unstable or unclear ideology decreased by 21% in the year ending March 2021 compared with the previous year (3,203). This category reflects instances where the ideology presented involves a combination of elements from multiple ideologies (mixed), shifts between different ideologies (unstable), or where the individual does not present a coherent ideology yet may still pose a terrorism risk (unclear). This also includes individuals that may be vulnerable out of a sense of duty, or a desire for belonging and those obsessed with massacre or extreme/mass violence without targeting a particular group.

- No CT ideology
- Undetermined ideology
- Conflicted ideology
- School Massacre ideology
- High CT risk but no ideology present
- No risk, vulnerability, or ideology present
- Vulnerability present but no ideology or CT risk


The final two options within the list are used when there is no clear ideological link to the concerns raised on referral and are used retrospectively by the case officers once further information gathering has been completed.

A total of 1,229 **referrals** (25%) were due to concerns related to Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation. The number of referrals for Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation concerns decreased by 11% compared with the previous year (1,387). In the year ending March 2021, for the first time since comparable data are available (year ending March 2016), there were more Extreme-Right Wing referrals than Islamist referrals.

There were 1,064 **referrals** (22%) were due to concerns related to Islamist radicalisation concerns. Referrals for concerns related to Islamist radicalisation decreased by 28% compared with the previous year (1,487). The number of referrals for this type of concern has decreased by 79% since the year ending March 2016 (4,997 referrals).

The remaining 100 **referrals** (2%) were due to concerns related to other types of radicalisation. Although numbers were comparatively low, this includes concerns regarding international radicalisation groups, left-wing radicalisation and Northern Ireland-related extremism, for example.


Figure 6: Prevent referrals by type of concern, years ending March 2016 to 2021



Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021. [Table 6](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021>)

Notes: Prior to the year ending March 2018, 'Mixed, unstable or unclear' referrals were categorised as 'unspecified'.

Figure 7: Type of concern of those referred, discussed at a Channel panel and adopted as a Channel case, year ending March 2021



Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021. [Table 6 \(https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021)


A total of 688 referrals were adopted as a **Channel case** and for the third consecutive year, there were more adopted cases for individuals referred for concerns related to Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation (317; 46%) compared to individuals with concerns related to Islamist radicalisation (154; 22%).

The number of referrals adopted as a **Channel case** for concerns related to Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation increased by 5% compared with the previous year (301), continuing the upward trend since the year ending March 2016. In comparison, the number of referrals adopted as a **Channel case** for Islamist radicalisation concerns decreased by 26% compared with the previous year (209). Since the year ending March 2016, the number of referrals adopted as a **Channel case** following a referral for Islamist radicalisation concerns has decreased by 41% (262 in the year ending March 2016).

There were 205 referrals adopted as a **Channel case** for individuals with a mixed, unstable or unclear ideology (30%). The number of referrals adopted as a **Channel case** for this type of concern has increased by 64% compared with the previous year (125).

The remaining 12 referrals adopted as a **Channel case** were for other radicalisation concerns (2%).

Figure 8: Channel cases by type of concern, years ending March 2016 to 2021



Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021. [Table 6](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021>)

3.5 Likelihood of adoption as a case by type of concern

Overall, the likelihood of referrals discussed at a Channel panel being adopted as a case increased from the previous year; 52% (688 of 1,333) of all referrals discussed went on to be adopted in the year ending March 2021, compared with 48% (692 of 1,432) in the previous year. However, referrals discussed at a Channel panel for individuals with Extreme Right-wing radicalisation concerns were most likely to be adopted as a case (317 of 557; 57%) compared with those with a mixed, unstable or unclear ideology (205 of 409; 50%) and those with concerns related to Islamist radicalisation (154 of 337; 46%).

3.6 Age by type of concern

For all types of radicalisation concern, where aged was known, those aged between 15 and 20 accounted for the largest proportion of those **referred** in the year ending March 2021. However, compared to the other types of concern, the age of those referred for Islamist radicalisation concerns (1,064) was more equally split between the age groups of 15 to 20 (286; 27%) and 21 to 30 (272; 26%).

The age of those referred that were adopted as a **Channel case** also differed by type of concern. For concerns related to Islamist radicalisation, the majority of individuals were aged 15 to 30 (98 of 154; 64%). For Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation concerns and those with a mixed, unstable or unclear ideology, the majority of cases involved those who were aged 20 and under (199 of 317; 63%, 134 of 205; 65%).

3.7 Gender by type of concern

For all types of radicalisation concern, the proportion of males **referred**, discussed at a Channel panel and adopted as a **Channel case** was higher than females. **Referrals, panel discussions and cases** for concerns related to Extreme Right-Wing were most likely to involve males, with males accounting for 97% (307 of 317) of Channel cases in the year ending March 2021. In comparison, 85% (131 of 154) of the adopted cases for concerns related to Islamist radicalisation involved males.

4. Regional trends

This section reports regional trends in referrals for individuals due to concerns regarding their vulnerability to the risk of radicalisation. Geographic regions are reported according to their progression through the Prevent programme and the type of concern raised. The geographic regions presented are those covered by Regional Prevent Coordinators (RPCs) and therefore within this statistical collection, the North East also covers Yorkshire and the Humber.


In the year ending March 2021, the region that received the highest number of **referrals** per million population was the East Midlands (108.9), followed by the North East (107.3). The North East and East Midlands have both been within the top three regions that received the highest number of **referrals** per million population in each of the previous three years (years ending March 2019 to 2021).

The region that had the highest number of referrals **discussed at a panel** per million population was the West Midlands (29.5). There have been greater fluctuations in the number of **discussions at panel** per million population within each region, however the East of England has consistently been in the top three regions that received the highest number of referrals **discussed at a panel** per million population in each of the previous three years.

The region that had the highest number of referrals adopted as a **Channel case** per million population was the North East (15.1), followed by the West Midlands (14.4) and the South East (13.7). The West Midlands has been within the top three regions that received the highest number of **Channel cases** per million population in each of the previous three years.

Please see Table 7 of [the accompanying data tables](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021>) for more detailed breakdowns.

Figure 9: Total number of referrals, those discussed at a Channel panel and adopted as a Channel case by region, year ending March 2021



Region	Total	Per million population	Total	Per million population	Total	Per million population
North East	881	107.4	188	22.9	124	15.1
North West	597	81.0	170	23.1	71	9.6
East Midlands	530	108.9	128	26.3	51	10.5
West Midlands	476	79.8	176	29.5	86	14.4
East	447	71.3	169	27.0	69	11.0
London	688	76.4	136	15.1	81	9.0
South East	774	84.0	244	26.5	126	13.7
South West	292	51.6	64	11.3	44	7.8
Wales	230	72.6	58	18.3	36	11.4
Total England and Wales	4,915	82.3	1,333	22.3	688	11.5

Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021. [Table 7](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021>). [Office for National Statistics, Population estimates for the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2020](https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/latest) (<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/latest>)


4.1 Region by type of concern

The regional distribution of referrals for Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation concerns per million population at each stage of the Prevent programme varied. The region that received the highest number of **referrals** per million population was the North East (30.8). However, the region that had the highest number of referrals per million population **discussed at a panel** (12.3) was the East Midlands, closely followed by the South East (12.3). The North East was also the region that had the highest number of adopted **Channel cases** per million population (8.8).

In contrast, for concerns relating to Islamist radicalisation, the region that received the highest number of **referrals** per million population was London (32.7). London also had the highest number of referrals per million population **discussed at a panel** (8.6) and adopted as a **Channel case** (4.7).

For concerns regarding individuals with a mixed, unstable or unclear ideology, the region that received the highest number of **referrals** per million population was the East Midlands (64.1). The region that had the highest number of referrals per million population **discussed at a panel** was the West Midlands (11.2) and the region that had the highest adopted **Channel cases** per million population was the South East (5.3).


Figure 10: Channel cases for Extreme Right-wing radicalisation concerns per million population by region, year ending March 2021



Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021. [Table 7](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021)
<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021>

[prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021](#)). [Office for National Statistics, Population estimates for the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2020](#)

(<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/latest>) ##### Figure 11: Channel cases for Islamist radicalisation concerns per million population by region, year ending March 2021



Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2020 to March 2021. [Table 7](#) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2020-to-march-2021>). [Office for National Statistics, Population estimates for the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2020](#) (<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/latest>)

5. Further information

The [user guide](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/user-guide-to-individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-england-and-wales) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/user-guide-to-individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-england-and-wales>) provides further details on this release, including the strengths and limitations of the data and the quality assurance processes involved in the production of this release. It also includes a glossary of terms used throughout this release.

5.1 Other related publications

Forthcoming publications are pre-announced on the [statistics release calendar](#) on GOV.UK website.

Previous releases of these statistics can be found [on GOV.UK](#) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-statistics>).

Police Scotland publish statistics on [the number of individuals referred to Prevent in Scotland](#). (<https://www.scotland.police.uk/about-us/police-scotland/prevent-referral-data/>)

5.2 Feedback and enquiries

If you have any feedback or enquiries about this publication, please contact HSAl_Statistics@homeoffice.gov.uk.

Home Office responsible statistician: Jodie Hargreaves

Press enquiries: pressoffice@homeoffice.gov.uk, Telephone: 020 7035 3535

The 'Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme' release is an Official Statistics output produced to the highest professional standards and free from political interference. It has been produced by statisticians working in the Home Office Analysis and Insight Directorate in accordance with the Home Office's '[Statement of compliance with the Code of Practice for Official Statistics](#)' (<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-compliance-with-code-of-practice-for-official-statistics>) which covers our policy on revisions and other matters. The Chief Statistician, and the Head of Profession, report to the National Statistician with respect to all professional statistical matters and oversees all Home Office Official Statistics products with respect to the [Code of Practice](#) (<https://code.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/>), being responsible for their timing, content and methodology.

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1. An additional 28 cases were open at the information gathering stage at the time of data confirmation (27 September 2021).
 2. The sector that the individual is signposted to upon exiting the Prevent process may engage other statutory partners to appropriately address the concern for that individual.

[↑ Back to top](#)

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Prevent Education Officer Update

Produced By:	Geraldine Cooper
For:	CONTEST Board - July 2022

Referrals and Support

In Q1 of this year 9 Channel referrals were made by schools. Of these 4 related to XRW ideologies, 2 to Daesh inspired ideologies and 3 were 'Mixed, Unclear, Unstable Ideologies'. Two of these referrals were accepted on to Channel, one with a positive outcome and now under three monthly review. The second was subsequently moved into police led space. The PEO has supported the school throughout this process.

The PEO continues to make contact with schools to follow up referrals and to offer support particularly with regard to embedding resilience and critical thinking in the curriculum. The Prevent Offer to Schools and DfE funded projects are shared with schools, targeting those schools which express Prevent related concerns either through the referral process or with requests for guidance and advice. Schools are encouraged to carry out a curriculum audit to identify opportunities across the curriculum to develop critical thinking skills and address contemporary contentious issues through well-managed discussion and dialogue. Training is offered to schools on 'Managing difficult conversations in the classroom'.

PEO Activity

Prevent Champions	Promoted across all schools, with expressions of interest from 4 schools. 1 school still in the process of completing their SEF.	To promote good practice in schools' / education settings capacity to meet the Prevent Duty with regard to both safeguarding and developing resilience to radicalisation through the curriculum.
Prevent Awareness Training	Two schools have received whole school Prevent Awareness Training for all staff.	All school staff meet the requirements of the Prevent Duty with regard to effective safeguarding and resilience building to extremist narratives.
Prevent Awareness Train the Trainer	Sessions delivered to DSL's from 3 Primary, 3 Secondary and 1 Special School in preparation for leading whole school Prevent Training at the start of the next academic year.	Increased capacity for schools to implement Prevent Awareness Training independently, including update and induction training.
School Support Secondary	'Building Resilience' workshops have been delivered across	Outcome – students increased knowledge and confidence in

(in addition to support following referrals).	<p>years 7 – 11 at Immanuel College. Year 12 students, not on work placement, have also participated in this workshop.</p> <p>'Raising Awareness of Risk' workshops have been delivered to the majority of students at Eden Boys' School.</p>	<p>responding to risk and raised awareness to think critically, particularly about on-line content.</p>
Support following Ofsted	<p>Students at Olive Boys School received critical thinking skills training, materials were supplied by PEO for delivery by Prevent Community Engagement Officer.</p> <p>Prevent Awareness Training Delivered to Igen, independent further education provider. This included staff from across the region. Not all establishments are located in Home Office funded authorities.</p>	<p>Student's increased knowledge and confidence in responding to risk and raised awareness to think critically, particularly about on-line content.</p> <p>Increased awareness of teaching and support staff of risk, identifying vulnerability and building resilience. Further sessions have been booked on 'Managing Difficult Conversations'.</p>
Collaboration	<p>Bradford College – Prevent Risk Assessment and Action Plan update.</p> <p>North East Regional Prevent Co-ordinator</p>	<p>The College meets the requirements of the Prevent Duty and links to Bradford's Prevent Plan.</p> <p>Bradford is following regional and national DfE guidance.</p>

Quarterly review of Prevent work within the District has identified the following:

Threats

Impact of XRW narratives on secondary school pupils in the Keighley area which is spreading to other areas of Bradford via social media.

Continued concern in the FE sector suggests that Tehree – e-Labbaik Pakistan has influence amongst young people in the area.

Challenges

1 Assessing risk / threat

1.1 Lack of information about the support for TLP in the area, sensitivity about collecting such

information.

1.2 Lack of knowledge about the organisations who may be targeting young Muslims and the media platforms that they use.

2 Engaging with education settings

2.1 There appears to be a high level of turnover in schools around DSL roles. This makes it difficult to maintain contact with DSL's, impacting on the dissemination of information, sharing of good practice etc. Due to workload secondary DSL's are not always able to offer in depth training on Prevent to new members of their safeguarding teams.

2.2 Schools do not always recognise opportunities across the curriculum to build resilience through an understanding of current events. Staff are not always confident to manage classroom discussion on such issues.

Successes

2 Partnership Work

2.1 Partnership working across all aspects of Channel / Prevent / CT and police continue to be a strength in Bradford. This has led to additional training and support being given to new safeguarding staff in schools, many of whom are not familiar with the Prevent referral process.

2.2 More schools are recognising the need for Prevent awareness Training that addresses local risks. They have either used the Train the Trainer programme or booked training for their staff. This addresses Challenges 2.2 in the last report.

2.3 Liaison with Bradford Hate Crime Alliance (Bradford Community Partnership) continues. Regular reviews of cases referred by schools for support and monitoring take place, including CTU, caseworkers, members of the Prevent team. These cases are often school Prevent referrals that do not meet Channel threshold.

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